THE SLOW DEATH OF LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

ALL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS ARE STILL IN POWER, BUT LOSE SUPPORT

Liberation movements arose in Southern Africa in the second half of the 20th Century to end with colonialism and white-minority rule, all sharing an African nationalism and socialist ideology. Three decades later all remain in power, but they are steadily losing support in young and changing societies which claim more accountability. This paper will analyze the context in which the Former Liberation Movements of Southern Africa (FMLSA) — formed by paries in six countries: ANC in South Africa, SWAPO in Namibia, ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe, MPLA in Angola, FRELIMO in Mozambique and CCM in Tanzania— arrived to power and how they have fared once in government, analyzing the similarities and differences amongst countries ●

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All liberation movements that arose to end colonial and white-minority rule in Southern Africa remain in power decades later. Ruling over a system which they fought to end, they have struggled to end racial and economic inequality.

All liberation movements in Southern Africa had common characteristics: they were all African nationalist movements, they all embraced marxist ideology and they involved in armed struggle against white oppressors.

Liberation movements had to forcefully accept a capitalist system imposed by foreign powers as socialism was in retreat following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Despite having similar contexts, struggles, nationalist purposes and socialist ideology, their time in power has also encompassed different realities.

Liberation movements have abandoned their socialist agenda and the ones who they fought for to pursue state capture and engage in dubious nepotist activities with white-owned large-capital.

The six Former Liberation Movements of Southern Africa have managed to win all multi-party elections since their arrival in power. However, all are losing support.

Liberation movements are facing a turning point in their rule. If they don't thrive for a profound reformulation of their party structures and government priorities, their end will be near.

Former Liberation Movements of Southern Africa

- South Africa - ANC
- Namibia - SWAPO
- Tanzania - CCM
- Mozambique - FRELIMO
- Angola - MPLA
- Zimbabwe - ZANU-PF

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
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

SOUTH AFRICA

- ANC - African National Congress: Main liberation movement currently in power since 1994
- DA - Democratic Alliance: Main opposition party, liberal ideology
- EFF - Economic Freedom Fighters: Third biggest party led by ex-ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema, extreme left ideology
- FFP - Freedom Front Plus: Fourth biggest party, extreme right afrikáner ideology
- PAC - Pan-Africanist Congress: Movement created by members who broke away with the ANC. Currently minor political party
- UK - Umkhonto we Sizwe: Armed wing of the ANC
- COSATU - Congress of South African Trade Unions: Largest trade union federation in the country
- BEE - Black Economic Empowerment: Program created by the ANC to achieve racial representativity
- BBBEE - Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment: Third phase of BEE aimed at benefiting the majority population
- UDF - United Democratic Front: A former anti-apartheid organization which gathered more than 600 entities from civil society

NAMIBIA

- SWAPO - South West African People's Organization: Main liberation movement currently in power since 1990
- SWANU- South West Africa National Union: Rival liberation movement which which drives its support from the Herero ethnic group. Currently a minor political party
- DTA - Demoractic Turnhalle Alliance: Main opposition party, conservative ideology. Currently known as Popular Democratic Movement (PDM)
- LPM - Landless People's Movement: new political party created by former deputy minister of land reform Bernadus Swartbooi, sacked by SWAPO
- PLAN - People's Liberation Army of Namibia: Armed wing of SWAPO
- NUNW - National Union of Namibian Workers: Largest trade union federation in the country.

ZIMBABWE

- ZANU-PF - Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front: Liberation movement union between ZANU and ZAPU. Since independence it is the main political party, currently in power since independence
- ZANU - Zimbabwe African National Union: Main liberation movement.
- ZAPU - Zimbabwe African People's Union: Main rival Liberation movement, former political party before being absorbed into ZANU-PF.
- MDC-T - Movement for Democratic Alliance - Tsvangirai: Main opposition party in Zimbabwe, split from MDC in 2005
- MDC - Movement for Democratic Alliance: Political alliance and main opposition group in Parliament.
- ZCTU - Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union: Largest trade union federation in the country

ANGOLA

- MPLA - People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola: Main liberation movement currently in power since independence
- UNITA - National Union for the Total Independence of Angola: Main rival liberation movement which fought civil war against MPLA and current main rival opposition party, conservative ideology
- FNLA - National Front for the Liberation of Angola: Rival liberation movement and currently a minor party, conservative ideology
- CASA-CE - Broad Convergence for the Salvation of Angola – Electoral Coalition: Political alliance in Angola born in 2012 and current third major force in Parliament, social democracy ideology
- FAPLA - Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola: Armed wing of MPLA

MOZAMBIQUE

- FRELIMO - Front for the Liberation of Mozambique: Main liberation movement currently in power since independence
- RENAMO - Mozambique National Resistance: Rival liberation party which which drives its support from the Herero ethnic group. Currently a minor political party. right-wing nationalism ideology
- MDM - Movimento Democratico de Moçambique: Third largest political party born in 2009, center-right ideology
- FPLM - Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique: Armed wing of FRELIMO

TANZANIA

- CCM - Chama Cha Mapinduzi: Main liberation movement, currently in power since independence
- CHADEMA - Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo: Main opposition party, center-right ideology.

GENERAL

- FMLSA - Former Liberation Movements of Southern Africa: Organization of support between current liberation movements, all of which share socialism marxism ideology and have been in power since independence. Made up of the six parties: ANC, SWAPO, ZANU-PF, MPLA, FRELIMO and CCM

INTRODUCTION

Traditional parties are in retreat and populism is on the rise in the world. The rise of new minor parties which preach against those who have ruled forever and against the established system is impregnating societies all across the globe. The main reasons provoking the loss of support of governing parties is the mounting corruption, the incapability of reverting inequality and the accommodation in power. In countries with strong parties the rise of particular leaders has broken the traditional dominance between one or two main groups. This has happened with Macron in France, Salvini in Italy or even Trump in the United States, which has focused the political debate around its figure despite representing the Republican Party. All of them represent the increasing importance of having a strong leader.

Southern Africa is not immune to these trends. The African liberation movements who fought for independence and were applauded worldwide for ending colonial and white-minority rule are still in government decades later. However, they are now facing a similar loss of support to other traditional parties around the world which that threatens their power. With some of the highest income inequalities in the world, corruption scandals and the lack of respect in some countries for democratic values, an increasingly young population is opting to support alternative options.

However, to put Southern African countries in the same picture as the rest of the world would be a profound mistake. The profound racial inequalities created by colonial powers is something unique to this region. Their inability to eliminate such racial and class differences is one of their main reasons for the decrease in support. This adds to the need to manage artificial states drawn by colonial powers. With some countries such as the post-apartheid South Africa being just 25 years old, the need to create a national identity and strong institutions has driven governments to establish a statism and bureaucratization of the country improper of diverse societies traditionally based on tribal practices. But Professor Steven Friedman believes that still now in South Africa, despite people holding the same flag and signing the same anthem, there is no unique national identity (Friedman, 2018).

The region has today the most advanced institutions in the continent, some of the richest countries in natural resources and some of the biggest economies in Africa, yet it still home to some of the most profoundly unequal, divided and rebellious societies. Yet each country has had a different trajectory. To understand why today South Africa has the highest income inequality in the world, why Zimbabwe is a failed state and why Angola despite being the second biggest oil producer in Africa has half its population living in poverty, we must take a look back and look at its roots.

Throughout history, Southern Africa has been affected by local, regional and international developments. In the 19th century this was the first region which European powers put a look on. Attracted by the advantageous positions of their ports for commercial purposes, the British and Portuguese powers established their presence with pockets of population. The interest rose with the disseverment of minerals in countries such as Angola, Namibia and South Africa, with an increased population coming to impose a European-style lifestyle amongst locals. Contrary to other African colonies where only a small number of people were driven to exploit each country's resources and then taken back home, in Southern Africa a settler colonialism was predominant (Southall, 2013).

Independence movements arose in the second half of the 20th century across all Sub-Saharan Africa to claim back what was theirs: their land, their institutions and their legitimacy to rule their own country. From Ghana to Djibouti, these countries broke the chains of European powers and those colonial rulers flew away. However, the settler colonies in Southern Africa would undergo a different process.
As Professor Friedman says, "democracy occurs when groups of people who are excluded from decisions develop a sufficient organized action" (Friedman, 2018). In Southern Africa liberation movements arose to end co-

lonial and white-minority rule. Democracy came with, but it wasn't part of their objective, this being achieving majority rule with an African nationalism and marxist ideology.

Their initial pacific resistance faced brutal contestation from fearful governments that were afraid that the independence revolts that had risen in the rest of the continent would spread to its territories. Many of these saw their rule in danger and feared having nowhere to go, as they had been established for centuries in Southern Africa. By the 1960s liberation movements came to accept that their fight for independence would not be pacific and started creating armed wings and guerrilla tactics (Southall, 2013).

LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AROSE TO FIGHT AGAINST MINORITY RULE

By the end of the 20th Century the region was to become a focal point of the Cold War, with the Eastern Bloc supporting liberation movements and the Western Bloc in the difficult situation of trying to prevent the rise of communism whilst not directly supporting openly racist and repressive governments which were increasingly badly seen by its citizens.

Weakened by long-fought conflicts, with the Cold War reaching an end and with a crippling Soviet Union, both sides accepted that a negotiated settlement towards independence and majority rule. White-minority rulers came to accept the end to their rule but where wise enough to reach agreements with the liberation movements which were being pressured by diminished international support. The first accepted independence and democratic transitional elections which liberation movements won. However, these had to accept to govern over a capitalist system as socialism was in retreat as the Society Union came to an end.

Having no experience in government and ruling over a system which they have fought to end, liberation movements were faced with the immense challenge of transforming its racially unequal institutions and society.

All those liberation movements who fought to end oppressive rule are still in power. They now form an organization called the Former Liberation Movements from Southern Africa (FLMSA) which was set as a successor of the Frontline States, the union created to support each other in the struggle for independence.

The organization is formed by six parties: the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia, Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe, People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Angola, Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) in Mozambique and Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in Tanzania.

With similar contexts and nature each has had different experiences in government. Whilst some have succeeded more than others, being South Africa and Namibia the most stable countries and Zimbabwe the clearest failure, they are all losing popular support which threaten their rule.

This paper will analyze the nature and context in which liberation movements were born to understand their actions in power and expose the main reasons of their decline in support. To conclude there will be a look into the results in elections of liberation movements by country throughout the years and an evaluation of their possibilities of holding onto power in the near future.

NATURE AND STRUGGLE

All liberation movements in Southern Africa had common characteristics: they were all African nationalist movements, they all embraced marxist ideology and they involved in armed struggle with military and guerrilla tactics against a common rival: settler colonialists that imposed a racial system of government that favored whites. All these characteristics intertwined in different manner and form across the different countries, but in all of them liberation movements came to embrace the will and struggle of the people.

First and foremost liberation movements came to represent African nationalism across Southern Africa, being their main goal to liberate their own citizens from white-minority rule. In their struggle, liberation movements have come to self proclaiming themselves as representatives of the will of the people, something which still lasts nowadays portraying themselves as the party of liberation.

During elections the now governing parties use slogans to remind their sole condition of liberators. In Zimbabwe for example, ZANU-PF repeats the claim that the country can't be governed by someone that didn't participate in the struggle for liberation (Dorman, 2006), in South Africa ANC officials have said that "the DNA of the Democratic Alliance (DA) is racist" and that only them can prevent the Boers from holding power again (Beresford et.al, 2018). Meanwhile, in Namibia the government has used in elections the slogan 'SWAPO is the nation and the nation is SWAPO' to eliminate any sign of patriotism of the opposition (Melber, 2003), even coming to accuse them of being traitors to the nation and spies aiming to bring back white-minority rule (Bauer, 2001).

However, the struggle for liberation was not an easy or united path behind one unique organization as these

parties now portray. All of them experienced difficulties in converting into the leading mass movements, suffering splits from within and competition with rivals. The ANC in South Africa was reduced to a small elite and chieftaincy until after the Second World War, when the creation of the Youth League sprung its militant action and changed its size and capabilities (Southall, 2013). But not even then it was to become the sole leading movement, as it had to compete with the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) formed by former militants that accused the ANC of abandoning African nationalism after agreeing its Freedom Charter, that embodied an alliance between classes and races stated that everyone should be equal before their law. Something similar happened in Zimbabwe, where the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) rivaled with the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) —who had previously joined forces in the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) to fight colonial power, a name which ZANU kept after independence although it competed in elections against ZAPU—. Meanwhile, in Namibia SWAPO confronted contestation from the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), divided between them along ethnic and strategic lines of action (Southall, 2013).

Furthermore, the PAC also split with the ANC as it refused its communist views. That is the second main characteristic of liberation movements. Born as nationalist movements, they soon embraced the socialist revolution which included ending with the capitalist system with the support of the masses. The fight to end white-minority rule then mixed with the struggle for socialism (Saul, 1994), foreseeing liberation as a first objective needed to achieve the second. Their situation took a global dimension in the panorama of the Cold War, with ideological and military support coming from the Soviet Union, China and Cuba. At the 1960s liberation movements came to acknowledge that non-violent re-

THE STRUGGLE WAS NOT UNITED BEHIND ONE UNIQUE MOVEMENT

sistance was failing and created armed wings that underwent guerrilla tactics. (Southall, 2013). Many of their fighters then supported themselves on training by their communist allies, which also provided weaponry and support. In Namibia SWAPO's armed wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), gathered support from MPLA armed wing, the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA), which gave them shelter in southern Angola to organize their attacks. Something similar happened with Umkhonto we Sizwe (UK), the armed wing of the ANC, which established its soldiers in Mozambique and received help from FRELIMO's armed forces, the Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique (FPLM) (Southall, 2013).

Angola and Mozambique were to be the centerpieces of the internationalization of the struggle. Both have similar characteristics: they were former Portuguese colonies, they both drew international attention and both fought a civil war between competing movements which sought to rule the country after independence. However, there are some differences which made Angola the focal point of the internationalization of the struggle for liberation. First, in Angola there were already anti-colonialist groups rivaling before independence divided on ethnic lines, MPLA having its major support from the Mbundu group, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) from the Kongo's and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) from the Ovimbundu's (Cadeado, 2010), whilst in Mozambique FRELIMO united all liberation parties before independence and it was not after it that the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) was created by dismissed fighters that escaped from military re-education camps (Leão, 2007). This gave Mozambique's liberation movement the legitimacy that the Angola's one didn't actually have despite controlling the ma-

jority of the country, including capital Luanda (Chabal, 2001), which also made it a lot more difficult to reach an agreement between both parts. Second, Angola had minerals that Mozambique lacked, such as oil and diamonds, the latter controlled by rival UNITA, which gave them power to fight. Third, leaderships were also very different, which lead to different ends.

While UNITA's leader Jonas Savimbi was determined to end the MPLA regime, in Mozambique RENAMO accepted to convert into a political party (Chabal, 2001). Finally, ideology played a major role in differentiating both countries. Whilst the MPLA was profoundly Marxist and its initial counterpart FNLA anti-Marxist, FRELIMO had grouped different anti-colonialists and was more pragmatic. All these factors led Angola to be the center-point of the Cold War board with UNITA, which occupied FNLA's position after it was defeated by MPLA's armed forces FAPLA, dragging support from the U.S. and South Africa's apartheid regime and MPLA supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba (Chabal, 2001). In Mozambique, however, RENAMO was used to shaken the FRELIMO government but its real interest and support remained regional rather than international, with both Rhodesia and South Africa interested in having allied neighbors and the apartheid regime worried of the ANC receiving foreign support (Chabal, 2001).

The decision to create armed branches and adopt guerrilla tactics that would work from the exile, together with the involvement in the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique, made liberation movements adopt military structures where discipline was enforced. The decision to take up armed struggle was to have direct consequences on their way of working, as it established a hierarchical system within the liberation movements instead of internal democracy rules (Southall, 2013), which is replicated once then reach state power (Louw-Vaudran, 2017). This, in turn, can explain the discredit of opposition figures who haven't participated in the armed struggle (Kossler, 2010), as being part of the struggle for liberation makes former fighters believe that they have the right to govern indefinitely and that younger generations born free should be respectful and grateful to adopt a second line in power (Clapham, 2012).

This contrasts with the expectations of liberation movements of embodying and enforcing a democratic culture in the liberated societies. Instead, when they reach state power they establish a strategy of hybrid governance which is vital to maintain power. They do celebrate elections, respect institutions and democratic norms on one side, which gives them a public and international appearance and status as consolidated democracies, whilst at the same time they have authoritarian practices aimed at their maintenance in power (Beresford et.al, 2018).

Understanding the nature in which liberation movements emerged and fought their wars for liberation is key to understand their trajectory once in government. It was in these previous years where the different liberation movements across Southern Africa supported each other, in some cases hosting them and helping them with military preparation. This camaraderie during the armed struggle is vital to understand their close relationship and mutual support once they all achieved government, which lasts until today despite serious divergences in their trajectories. For the rest of the paper it is vital to take into account therefore the characteristics that underpinned liberation movements: they were born primarily as nationalist groups which soon adopted socialist ideology and structured as hierarchical organizations once they took the armed struggle in a panorama of Cold War conflict where international support was important for their quest. For former fighters, the struggle is A Luta Continua (Saul, 2010).

CONSTRAINTS

Liberation movement's arrival to power implied in all cases reaching agreements with their previous oppressors with the mediation of foreign powers. Although theirs was an armed struggle, their access to power didn't arrive through violent means, or not uniquely, but rather with hard fought compromises that limited their possibilities of action in power.

The costly long-fought conflicts, together with the internationalization of the struggle and the draining support for white-minority rulers from Western backers, forced all parts into reaching agreements.

In today's Zimbabwe Ian Smith was under pressure from the US and the UK and after several tries of sharing up power with moderate Africans such as Bishop Abel Muzorewa, he conceded to hold talks with ZANU-PF, which ended in the Lancaster House agreement in 1979. This ensured elections with majority rule and granted independence to the country as Zimbabwe a year later. However, the new constitution provided for a political order which protected the white-minority and its institutions, as they were granted 20 of the 72 seats in the House of Assembly and space in the cabinet for at least seven years (Southall, 2013).

In Namibia independence came linked to the war in Angola. South Africa —with U.S. support— was fighting MPLA in Angola, which had military support from Cuba and also from PLAN, SWAPO's armed wing, who was fighting too to destabilize South Africa's apartheid regime in control of their territory. As the U.S. was getting more reluctant to further support a racist government as South Africa's, Cuba was losing many of its 50,000 men in the war and South Africa was feeling economic and domestic pressure (Southall, 2013), the perspective of an agreement to withdraw its troops became reasonable. In 1988, The Tripartite

Agreement was signed in New York which agreed for the withdrawal from the Angolan war and the Namibian independence under UN supervision (Leão, 2007). After SWAPO swept its rivals in the 1989 elections, Namibia achieved its independence in 1990.

That same year South African President de Klerk put the first step towards the end of apartheid formally legalizing the ANC, liberating Nelson Mandela and starting difficult negotiations with all opposition parties (Southall, 2013), which culminated four years later in the first ever truly democratic elections, which the ANC won and after which Mandela became the first black head of state.

Meanwhile, a final agreement which granted peace took longer in Mozambique and Angola. In both countries the end of the Cold War was to play a significant role in international pressure to reach an agreement. However, in Mozambique peace was more attractive for RENAMO than for UNITA in Angola due to various reasons. First, RENAMO had lost international support that UNITA still had, second, Mozambique didn't have natural resources whilst UNITA had access to diamonds in Angola and finally and most importantly, Savimbi had the only goal of converting into the sole ruler of Angola whilst RENAMO's leader Afonso Dhlakama accepted to compete for power in the political arena with FRELIMO. Beyond personalistic reasons, historical factors explain this, as the MPLA was in competition with UNITA for anti-colonial leadership, whilst FRELIMO had the recognition of the sole liberation movement, as RENAMO only came up to shake their rule after independence. In essence, UNITA wanted to occupy MPLA's place, whilst RENAMO wanted to play in FRELIMO's league (Chabal, 2001).
After two years of negotiation with mediation from the

Church, the Rome General Peace Accords was signed which brought the conversion of RENAMO into a formal political party and the demobilization of its soldiers and integration of some in the Mozambican army. In Angola, however, the prospects of peace were different. In 1991 the Bicesse Accords were signed which gave path to elections in 1992, but after the MPLA won, Savimbi's UNITA didn't accept the results and resumed war. The conflict was again was paused in 1994 after the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in a moment where UNITA was suffering, but instead of helping to achieve peace it was used by Savimbi to regroup, obtain arms and fuel to fight back. It wasn't until 2002 with the death of its leader Savimbi and declining military and financial resources that UNITA accepted to sign the Luena Memorandum of Understanding with MPLA (Leão, 2007).

Once in power after signing settlements, liberation movements faced with the initial problem of reforming racist and unequal societies and institutions. All of this had to be done without knowledge or education on how to rule a government, with institutions dominated by white personnel and having to forcefully accept a capitalist system imposed by foreign powers after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Southern African states differ with other countries in the continent in that prior to liberation power was not in hand of a small elite who gathered all power and freedoms, but was rather enjoyed based on their race. This means that all whites did enjoy basic democratic norms such as civil liberties and the right to vote, but at the expense of the majority black population. Liberation movements therefore claimed and sought what whites had, but for all, eliminating racial barriers (Friedman, 2019). This was to have an important effect once they arrived to government. Instead of removing them directly, liberation movements acknowledged the need to count on

whites, at least on the short term, for various reasons: first, because of their experience in managing state institutions, which former fighters lacked, second because they controlled high management positions and the economy and replacing them immediately would be counterproductive and third and finally because liberation movements had committed to racial reconciliation (Southall, 2013), which obliged them to include them in public institutions.

With all, liberation movements had the immense challenge of converting state institutions of representative of their population, especially top positions, which were the most imbalanced. Balancing all needs, the new governments adopted affirmative action to transform state institutions primarily through constitution provisions or new laws enacted, but these varied between countries.

In Zimbabwe the government decided to double the number of civil service servants, maintaining whites but incorporating blacks (Sibanda, 1988), in South Africa, where whites accounted for up to 94% of managements positions in 1994, goals of achieving 50% blacks in high-level posts were set for 1999 (Naidoo, 2008) and in Namibia SWAPO gave preference to disadvantaged groups in assigning new officials and reduced experience requirements (Jauch, 1999).

Adding up to the difficulties that liberation movements faced was their already mentioned inexperience in government. State transformation had to happen whilst learning how to run a government. Whilst they did had experience in guerrilla warfare and military organization, a state was a different enterprise that required different principles. Whilst fighting a war meant having firm hand with whoever deviated from the official line,

THE NEW LEADERS FOUGHT IN GUERRILLAS BUT LACKED EXPERIENCE IN OFFICE

governing necessarily meant reaching agreements and accepting and embracing different points of view. In summary, flexibility had to replace rigidity (Clapham, 2012).

Last but not least, it cannot be forgotten the international context in which liberation movements acceded power. With socialism in retreat after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990, the world was now ruled by a globalized capitalist system which had the holding hand over those in need of capital (Southall, 2013). The leaders of the new states had to agree if to pursue radical socialist policies as promised, which would alienate their struggling economies from international investment, or accept to play in the new world order. As Mandela told his fellow party members: "Chaps, we either keep nationalization and get no investment or we modify our attitude and get investment" (Sampson, 2011). The latter was chosen in all countries on a first note, however the adherence to this policy varied over time in the different Southern African countries, as we will see in the following section on the different records of liberation movements in power.

TRAJECTORIES

All liberation movements in Southern Africa stepped in the two decades between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s with similar contexts, nationalist purposes and socialist ideology. However, their time in power has also encompassed different realities. Trying to tar with the same brush their trajectories would be a massive error. They all had different paths in three main areas: democracy, society and civil liberties and economy and relations with business. From Zimbabwe to Namibia, experiences differ greatly. At the end of the section we will try to outline various factors which have determined the differences between trajectories.

DEMOCRACY

Liberation movements came to power embracing the hopes for democracy. However, as contradictory as it may seem, they were non-democratic themselves, so they could hardly meet those expectations (Clapham, 2012). Their own nature marks their differences with traditional liberal democracy. They base their right to govern on the armed struggle and blur the line between the will of the people and their own will, stating a ex-clusivist nationalism approach which united to their adherence to Marxist theories and their mutual solidarity to create an international force group that legitimized their power (Southall, 2014).

However, each country has a different record on democracy. Whilst South Africa and Namibia have fared well, Tanzania and Mozambique have had its ups and downs and Angola and especially Zimbabwe have barred democracy. The first two rank as part of the only eight African countries considered a democracy — flawed democracies, not full, though. The only full democracy is Mauritius—, whilst the latter are all considered 'authoritarian regimes' (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018).

Zimbabwe ranks last of all five as the government has imposed violence, repression amongst opposition parties and discredited electoral outcomes for decades. The joint fight as Patriotic Front to end white-minority rule didn't translate into a political alliance for the first democratice elections in 1980, which Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF won over ZANU. The fragile balance broke in 1983 when violence erupted in Matabeleland in the north of the country, where ZANU had its stronghold, whilst ZANU-PF focused his on the south (Nantul-ya, 2017). Mugabe underwent a severe crackdown that ended up in the banning of ZANU and its final absorption into ZANU-PF in 1987, which converted Zimbabwe in reality in a one-party state with 99 out of 100 seats in Parliament, despite the president's failed attempts to formally establish the country as such

(Muzondidye, 2009). Since then, ZANU-PF has repeatedly used coercion as means to retain power as its loss of support increased. This has coupled with its marked refused to accept negative electoral outcomes, not conceding defeat in the 2008 elections to Morgan Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Alliance (MDC-T), and only finally accepting to share power in a mixed cabinet where Mugabe retained the presidency and ZANU-PF control over state security forces, which are the ones that put into practice duress and repression (Southall, 2013).

Angola and Mozambique have had turbulent relations with democracy. Although both countries had its first multiparty elections in 1992 and 1994 respectively, conflict with main opposition parties have continued ahead limiting democracy. In Angola UNITA didn't accept its defeat and resumed the civil war which lasted until 2002, whilst RENAMO resurged to insurgency in 2013 as it was losing momentum and tensions still remain. However, in August 2019 the party accepted to sign a new peace agreement, this time called the Peace and National Reconciliation Agreement, which is the hope of many to achieve a durable and lasting peace.

In Angola one man has stood ahead: José Eduardo dos Santos ruled for a small elite during his 25 years in power, allocating family to prominent positions leading oil companies, which has helped her daughter Isabel be the wealthiest women in Africa (Alfa, 2017). Dos Santos however decided to step down in 2017 in a promising democratic movement that has seen power land in João Lourenço, who in its first two years has taken promising economic and anti-corruption reforms which include the firing of Isabel Dos Santos as head of oil company Sonangol. Despite positive moves, researchers call for caution as Lourenço is yet to prove his measures are not only a manner of reinforcing his power and distancing himself from his predecessor's legacy (Fabricius, 2019). Meanwhile in Mozambique, the appearance of a third party, Movimento Democratico de Moçambique (MDM), has challenged its position as main opposition party (Regalia, 2017).

In both countries MPLA and FRELIMO have blocked calls from UNITA and RENAMO for decentralization. While introducing local elections could reinforce their power, ruling parties have more to lose than to win as they don't control the entire country, with certain regions of the country where opposition parties could win mobilizing its support bases in local elections.

Furthermore, control of natural resource places an important factor in both countries. Gas was discovered in Mozambique's north coast in 2010 and since RENAMO has pushed further for decentralization to control revenues over extraction in provinces such as Zambezia and Nampula, where their support has grown (Regalia, 2017). In Angola MPLA has used oil resources to establish a network of patronage throughout the country that enables it to maintain power, a system which could be at risk in a decentralized state with UNITA competing for power in oil-rich regions (Aalen & Maarias, 2016).

Tanzania has managed to leave ethnicity outside of politics, with the CCM gaining support from a broad variety of voters (Lofchie, 2013). However, tit has a mixed record. Officially a one-party state until 1992, since then CCM has won all five general elections, but recently has decreased its support and president John Magufuli has resorted to repression. Magufuli has stifled democracy, banning opposition gatherings and passing laws to be able to control the funding, membership and strategies of opposition parties (Ahearne, 2018).

LIBERATION MOVEMENT SOLIDARITY GOES BEYOND RESPECT FOR DEMOCRACY

On the other hand are South Africa and Namibia. Despite corruption cases in the first and increased intolerance to dissent in the second, both still renew their power through people's will (Southall, 2013), effectively meaning they win internationally recognized free and fair elections. Many argue that in the context in which South Africa was at the time of independence, with deep racial divisions, rampant inequality and poverty, its democratic institutions have proved strong and stable beyond expectations, surviving corrupt leaders (Friedman, 2019). In Namibia, SWAPO has remarkably respected democratic norms since independence (Legum, 1992) and voters have answered back. SWAPO is at the moment the only party who has increased its votes in each election since independence (Louw-Vaudran, 2017). In both countries the key has been strong constitutions supported by broad groups in the political spectrum and civil society which has reinforced separation of powers and, ultimately, put a stranglehold on those who have tried to use state institutions in their favor. In South Africa Professor Friedman argues that although the separation of powers is real, the problem is it only operates for some, not more than a third of the population (Friedman, 2018). Constitutionalism has also fostered internal democracy in both ruling parties, blocking presidents from remaining in power. Strong constitutions helped stop Thabo Mbeki's initial plan of running for a third term. Although it did not prevent Sam Nujoma running for a third term, it did prevent him running a fourth, establishing since peaceful and smooth presidential transitions each two terms (Vines, 2016).

These different records can be explained due to various reasons. First, the characteristics of each political settlement help to understand each country's democratic future. In South Africa, for example, the foundations for an agreement lasted four years and involved many actors, including civil society groups and many opposition parties (Southall, 2014). However, in Namibia and Zimbabwe the agreements were forced upon by foreign actors, signed under deep suspicions between both sides and didn't have enough support from civil

society (Van Zyl Slabbert, 1992). Whilst in Namibia democracy has been more or less highly respected, in Zimbabwe it has been destroyed. Second, the dominance of each liberation movement in the struggle has influenced in providing stability. Whilst the ANC and SWAPO triumphed in South Africa and Namibia respectively as the sole liberation movements in the struggle, without real dispute for their hegemony, in Zimbabwe ZANU-PF had to impose its political dominance over ZAPU (Southall, 2014), in Angola MPLA received contestation from UNITA and in Mozambique FRELIMO's unity shattered once independence was achieved and since has rivaled with RENAMO (Chabal, 2001). Finally, the adherence to democracy has been stronger in countries where constitutionalism has prevailed, with clear separation of power that has help to limit the government's domination.

However, liberation movements' adherence to democracy can be at risk if the prospect of losing national elections is to come, as shown in Zimbabwe. Support for ZANU-PF from governments in Southern Africa proves liberation movement solidarity goes beyond respect for democracy (Southall, 2013). Their support for such brutal regime can serve as an example on how ANC or SWAPO could react if the bell rings and its their time to step down from power.

SOCIETY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

The defense of democracy and respect for civil liberties and human rights such as freedom of association, right to protest or media freedom are usually intertwined. The more democratic the state, the more tolerant and stronger the civil society. However, this does not always occur. There are some democratic countries with a weak civil society whilst other autocratic governments can find a mobilized and participative population. When analyzing relations that liberations movements have had with civil society it is key to point

out their role in the pre-independence era, the type of existing organizations and their links to government or opposition. Furthermore, it is vital also to dig into the treatment that liberation movements have had with independent media outlets, whose main mission is to hold governments accountable in any democracy. Civil society movements prior to independence, as practically everything in those states, were racially divided between whites and the rest. The former would be legal and would give an image of a democratic government to apartheid regimes, but if their critiques turned into radical activity and support of majority rule, they would be banned (Southall, 2013). In this context, opposition movements were repressed where they appeared, especially prominent in urban areas from the 1970s onwards. This made them unite and accept the authority of liberation movements, as the United Democratic Front (UDF), a pan-organization of 600 entities, did in South Africa, where civil society was way more advanced and structured than in other Southern Africa countries (Southall, 2013).

For liberation movements receiving support from civil society and trade unions was a vital part in their success, as this gave them broad support and legitimacy in their struggle. However, this also made them dependent on them (Clapham, 2012). That's why, when independence was achieved, civil society groups and trade unions underwent vital transformations in their relationships with liberation movements. All liberation movements had the same objective once in power: incorporating civil society movements into their state vision and creating a cohesive society under the revolution principles. This effectively translates into controlling society (Southall, 2014). This was easier in some countries than in others and therefore, different tactics where pursued.

For example, in Zimbabwe ZANU-PF imposed loyalty to their party in the name of revolution and those who do not commit to these premises are ruthlessly repressed with violence. This was coupled with legislation to restrict NGOs and increase its control over poten-

tially conflicting places such as universities (Dorman, 2003). At the same time ZANU-PF disregarded trade unions as they emphasized the importance of their armed fight over workers support in the struggle, with repression immediately exerted over the first post-independence protests. Ultimately, with the economic downturn approaching, the biggest labour movement, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) joined civil society groups to create the political party MDC (Sachinkoye, 2001), which has come to threaten ZANU-PF's hold on power at the extent of ZCTU, who has since lost power and influence as the bastion of the opposition. As they have seen their rule threatened, ZANU-PF has resorted to yet more violence to maintain in power, threatening all sectors of civil society (Freeman, 2014).

Civil society movements have had a different trajectory in other countries. In Namibia and South Africa approaches to labour movements have been friendly, but outcomes have differed. Whilst both countries have sought alliances with leading trade unions, the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) has professed much more obedience to SWAPO than the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) has to the ANC (Southall, 2013). This resonates with the conformation of each society, as South African civil society is much more active, diverse and vigilant of power, whilst Namibians are supportive of SWAPO's policies (Keulder & Hishoono, 2009) and are considered the citizens which most respect its leaders across Africa (Logan et. al., 2006). South Africa's civil society has a major presence, but it differs mainly in that its purpose is not merely political, but rather diverse, with a wide variety of groups defending specific issues such as environment, housing, energy and HIV awareness, and that is not merely confrontational with the government, as it has groups which openly criticize and oppose ANC policies and others that engage with it, with some even doing both depending on each circumstan-

Figure 4: Protests and riots in sub-Saharan Africa, 2007 versus 2017

Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project.

ce (Marais, 2010).

Tired of an ever older political class which fails to deliver on economic redistribution, an increasingly young and urbanized population is taking the streets to protest. From 2007 to 2017 protests have vastly increased across all the continent (Bello-Schünermann & Moyer, 2018) and are set to continue increasing unless governments pursue economic policies for all, end with corruption and open the political spectrum to a younger generation. In South Africa, the world's most economically unequal country, protests have reached historical maximums since 2012 (ACLED, 2018). With a historic tradition of civilian unrest coming from apartheid times, protests now focus on townships in urban areas and range from demands on service delivery to student and corruption critiques (Bello-Schünermann & Moyer, 2018).

All of these tendencies in civil liberties and each society's structure reflect in the state of the media. The World Press Freedom Index 2019 reports Namibia and South Africa as the two best countries in Africa for journalists, with both listed as having a satisfactory situation.

They rank 29th and 31st worldwide respectively, getting better score than other Western democracies such as the United States, 44th, Italy, 43rd or France, 32nd on the list. On the other side are Zimbabwe and Tanzania that are marked in red as difficult countries for journalists, whilst Angola and Mozambique are considered a bit better, but still having a problematic relation with press freedom (Reporters Without Borders, 2019). The organization points to diverse tendencies, with Angola opening up having recognized the right to inform and acquitting journalists since the arrival of Lourenço as president and Tanzania suffering an attack on press freedom under Magufuli's presidency, nicknamed the 'Bulldozer' for his efforts to silence independent media. Similar situation has Zimbabwe, where attacks on journalists have continued despite the change of leadership (Reporters Without Borders, 2019).

However, even South Africa'a government has tried to curtail press freedom when media has investigated into corrupt practices in public office. This has mainly happened under Zuma's presidency, when the ANC

tried to put forward the Protection of Information Bill which would give the government the ability of curtailing press freedom based on national security interests (Southall, 2013). But then again South Africans united to oppose the attack on press freedom and stopped Zuma from signing the proposal into law. All in all, this case shows that the ANC was ready to put their own interests over democracy (Southall, 2013), a worrying precedent which reaffirms liberation movements' thrust of subjecting society to their state vision.

ECONOMY AND RELATIONS WITH BUSINESS

Liberation movements were faced with massive problems and dilemmas upon their arrival on power. They embraced socialist ideals, but socialism was crippling around the world. They stepped into immensely unequal economies in favor of whites, but were dependent on their experience and work on the short term to advance. They embraced nationalization of lands and companies, but were dependent on foreign investment from international organizations which made it conditional to accept the capitalist system predominant in the new international order.

With all of these obstacles, some have fared better than others. To understand why, it is key to explore how each government has related itself with private businesses and international actors, as well as the policies taken to deracialize and distribute wealth amongst their citizens.

Angola must be considered apart due to the nature of its economy. Contrary to other Southern African countries which have, to a major or lesser extent, diversified its economy between a labor-intensive agriculture, a capital-intensive mining sector and also an important tertiary sector where tourism plays an important role, Angola still depends way too much in its oil resources, this proved by the 2008 financial crisis which dramatically reduced public investment after economic growth slumped (De Oliveira, 2011). Since then it hasn't been able to recover its annual +10% GDP growths achieved

after the end of conflict in 2002, even entering recession in 2016 (World Bank, 2017). Despite a contraction in growth in the last decade, it is the continent's third largest economy, the second oil exporter and has significant incidence in Sub-Saharan Africa's growth (World Bank, 2019).

However, Angola's oil revenue hasn't reached all Angolans. Instead, it has stayed in the hands of those living in areas connected to the MPLA, mainly in urban and coastal areas, which have also received most public expenditure. This resonates with the liberation movement's main plan of creating a national bourgeoisie that legitimates their power rather than focusing on alleviating poverty (De Oliveira, 2011). With 48% of its population considered poor (OPHI, 2016), and despite leaders vocalizing social concern for all since peace was achieved, the MPLA sees the poor more as a burden than a solution for development (Vines, 2005).

In Angola relations with foreign companies that extract oil from its coasts has been critical for its economic growth. Relationships with businesses have also proved to be vital for economic development in other countries such as Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. Once independence was achieved, businesses that controlled the economy in the white minority-rule era wished to continue with its dominance and sought to establish relations with the new government. Meanwhile, the new governments needed from their activity to push their economies forward whilst at the same time had to strive to transform and render the economy representative of the population, which necessarily meant including the majority black population.

Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa have undergone, to a certain extent, similar paths. In all three countries reform coalitions were pursued between businesses and state and have been, notwithstanding difficult moments, successful. FRELIMO, SWAPO and the

ANC acknowledged the need of forging alliances with large businesses which ruled their countries economy until independence and allowing for foreign investment to capitalize its economy. Once the objective of pursuing a socialist agenda was discarded, liberation movements were focused in proving that their state project could pair with a capitalist society in a globalized world.

In South Africa and Namibia deep relations where established between the ANC and SWAPO which enabled financial and mining capital to continue its dominance and establish trust in state institutions. In Namibia the government managed to reach power sharing agreements with the most powerful mining companies such as De Beers, which granted the state a 50% share in mining corporations (Southall, 2013). These coalitions have not achieved enough success to reach the economic growth that Angola had in the first decade, but have provided for relatively constant growth and a more stable situation than their neighbor. In Mozambique the situation was slightly different as the country came for decades-long conflict stemming from the independence and civil wars. This made that by 1992 the country didn't have the business conglomerate that white-minority rule states had in South Africa in Namibia. Mozambique's post-conflict country tag brought the fear of renewed conflict and helped to capitalize development aid and foreign investment, which focused on extractive industries and concentrated in capital Maputo (Vines et. al., 2015). This capital was vital for its economy as locals didn't have money to invest and 93% Mozambicans agree that foreign investment helped to foster economic growth (Brooks, 2017).

Nonetheless, the economic success story does not offer a full picture. Growth came at the expense of small and

A WELL CONNECTED ELITE HAS BENEFITED IN EXPENSE OF THE MAJORITY

medium enterprises (SMEs), as liberation movements favored big businesses-oriented policies rather than the diversification of wealth. While it is true that liberation movements such as the ANC used economic surplus to develop an important social net for the poor, which account for the majority of its voters, the system focused on large-scale capital and didn't produce enough incentives for the appearance of small entrepreneurs, which were further faced off by bureaucracy and the openness to globalization (Taylor, 2007) Mozambican SMEs were frustrated with the government as they faced high competition from foreign businesses, had to pay elevated rent for property and didn't benefit from tax reductions that corporations agreed (Brooks, 2017). In a similar way, South African manufacturers became vulnerable in the globalist arena (Southall, 2013). Facing back SMEs has proved to be counter-productive on the long-term, as these countries still face massive income inequalities, unemployment rates reaching pre-independence rates and massive corruption, which has all generated a social discontent that will be analyzed later.

Notwithstanding the setbacks mentioned, business state relations have proved essential for the functioning of the economies in the three Southern African countries. A prove of this is Zimbabwe. With similar initial agreements with businesses as other liberation movements in government, relations deteriorated rapidly between state and the private sector. Four factors are to be taken into account: first, the export-oriented policies showed the shortcomings of local industries in the international sphere; second, political pressure mounted upon ZANU-PF as the war veterans mobilized for land seizure and MDC was formed; third, Mugabe had since the start been skeptical with liberalization poli-

cies (Southall, 2013), and viewed private businesses as a way of extracting benefits rather than setting them as the drivers of a productive economy and fourth, the business community was divided by sectors and interests, which reduced their bargaining power against the government (Dawson & Kelsall, 2012).

In Zimbabwe political issues imposed over any other policy. Here it is vital to point out the issue of land reform, which was a final blow for its economy. With 45,000 war veterans excluded from the new army, their protests claiming land ownership began soon after independence (Mamdani, 2008) and by the year 2000 they began a massive invasion of white-owned lands. How did the government answer? It stuck together with its veterans and launched the fast track resettlement programme which promoted unconstitutional and unlawful land expropriation without compensation, achieved by ZANU-PF by imposing its dominance over the judiciary, media and ending any resemblance to the rule of law (Mamdani, 2008). The assault on land property drastically reduced food production, as productivity plummeted with unexperienced land owners that lacked capacity, labour force and modern machinery. The effects of such policies still resonate nowadays, with 5.3 million people facing food insecurity and 62.6% of Zimbabweans living below the poverty line (World Food Programme, 2019). The policy resettled up to 130,000 families in about 10 million hectares (Moyo, 2011), and despite all of its problems, ZANU-PF at least achieved acceptation and support amongst the rural population (Mamdani, 2008).

Current movements in South Africa are worryingly similar to those taken by ZANU-PF at the start of the century. With rising political opposition from former ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema, whose new radical left party Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) has come to threaten its majority by carving into its voters, the ANC has started to concede to land reform without expropriation. The government has taken firm steps to amend section 25 of the Constitution to allow this to happen and president Ramaphosa has re-

peatedly explained that expropriation will be different than in Zimbabwe and will be done in an orderly manner, for which he has called upon land owners to collaborate on the reform whilst at the same time advising those still refusing todo so that they "cannot resist" to this happening (Mokone, 2019). Whilst Namibia also has a land distribution problem, SWAPO's dominance over civil society and the political spectrum makes it easier to avoid the topic (Gopaldas & Ndhlovu, 2018), but reforms in South Africa could propel calls for similar policies in its neighbor country.

Land expropriation is just one of the policies sought to address the racial economic divide between whites and blacks. South Africa aimed to reduce the gap with its Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) program which Namibia followed, whilst Zimbabwe propelled indigenization laws, all having the objective of promoting black citizens into management and ownership positions at both public and private institutions to create a black middle class that controlled the economy (Southall, 2013). As much as this was partly achieved, BEE served liberation movements to control the state and the economy by appointing family members and party members and supporters to cover such positions, promoting a culture of nepotism that has fueled corrupt practices and received major criticism as scandals have been made public.

This has been one of the main sins that liberation movements have committed, as they have left out the majority of its population —and hence its voters— and prevented their personal development in expense of a small, well-connected troupe of party loyalists that eat.

SINS

Liberation movements arrived in power in the midst and end of the Cold War. Supporting socialist ideologies, some countries like Angola and, to a lesser extent, Mozambique were converted into the centerpiece of the war between the Western and the Eastern Bloc with international actors sending their troops supporting one on other side in civil wars. Both wars ended as the actors were worn off having lost many lives. Finally, with the fall of the USSR, the socialist hopes in southern Africa were dashed by the new international order. In need of foreign investment to refloat damaged and racially unequal economies, the liberation movements recently arrived in power had to accept a capitalist system to ensure their short-term survival.

In this context a new set of leaders came to power with many regional issues too, mainly to fix a state which had divided its population by race and hence, created a majority black population which lacked the education, skills and access to be the engine of the economy. This added to mounting pressures calling for the liberalization of the economy and the democratization of states. All of this had to be done by a group of people who had adopted guerrilla tactics in exile and had experience in confronting the state, but not in controlling it.

Notwithstanding this context, liberation movements have committed several gross errors which are to be pointed out as the main reasons for their gradual loss in support. From abandoning their socialist agenda to focusing on state capture through political deployment of party members and engaging in dubious nepotist activities with white-owned large-capital, liberation movements have abandoned the ones who they fought for,

LIBERATION MOVEMENTS KNELT TO LARGE SCALE CAPITAL DEMANDS

sidelining its youth and the majority black population who suffer similar income inequalities and unemployment rates as they did in apartheid times. Inter-party fights between members craving for power indicates that liberation movements have forgotten why and who they fought for and now instead fight between them for the same privileges they once fought against.

DECLINE IN IDEOLOGY

Liberation movements in Southern Africa soon adopted Marxist ideology, calling for the nationalization of companies and a socialist project focused on redistributing power amongst the poor. But this has been completely abandoned. Upon their arrival of power liberation movements confronted a rotten economy locked up in the past and first a modernization of the forces of production was needed with support from foreign capital that would enable the country to swift gradually to socialism (Southall, 2014).

Once in power, Marxist ideology was used to justify capturing state power and exposing the liberation movements as the leaders of the struggle. The new governments such as the ANC came to call for the creation of a patriotic bourgeoisie, a term coined to describe a class of people that would accept and use capitalism in the benefit of the state, prioritizing state power over wealth (Southall, 2014). Whilst using Marxism to defend its position, this was itself already a deviation of socialism, as they were willing to accept creating of a bourgeoisie instead of addressing wealth distribution. Instead they started to term the concept 'transformation', which put above racial equality over social equality (Southall, 2013).

Liberation leaders have since stressed that there was no option but to adopt a neoliberalism agenda, blaming the new world order after the defeat of the Soviet Union for their abandonment of socialism and claiming they did so in defense of democracy, which was at risk if economy collapsed (Marais, 2010). However, this is not entirely true, as although the defeat of socialism in the Cold War placed a burden on their initial agenda, depriving them from much needed foreign investment from the Eastern Bloc, kneeling to large-scale capital demands wasn't the only option. Once independence was achieved differences rose in the nationalist side, with class distinctions rising and a small middle-class leading policymaking in the new liberated governments, a group which had been lured by big businesses to lobby in their favor (Southall, 2013). The continued economic dominance by those who ruled in the apartheid regime has buried hopes for effective redistribution of wealth and perpetuated inequalities, leading to what some call as a 'false decolonization' or 'recolonization' (Saul, 2005).

STATE INEFFICIENCY

One of the main objectives and challenges that liberation movements faced was to deracialize the state, from its institutions to its economy. The new governments saw ensuring representativeness in terms of race at state institutions as a vital step to restore public trust and their legitimacy (Ndletyana, 2008). In South Africa, ANC's 'affirmative action' policies promoting the employment of black people achieved a remarkable success, having in 2007 a 78.3% workforce of Africans and achieving an exact 78.3% representation in the public service in 2008 (Milne, 2009), although jobs for blacks were still mostly at the bottom of the pyramid (Naidoo, 2008).

At the cost of delivering their promise of racial equality, liberation movements turned state institutions into inefficient machines. In Namibia this policy caused that one in four positions at senior management level were vacant and an additional third were also left empty at middle tiers (Naidoo, 2008). This indicates that whites understood that state institutions where now a place for

blacks and pointed towards other professional careers and at the same time that there was a lack of black qualified candidates (Southall, 2013). This was to be even worsened by the futile expansion of the public service. As whites couldn't be just kicked out because of reconciliation policies and their experience in management and blacks had to be absorbed, in countries like Zimbabwe state officials went from 40.000 to 80.000 (Sibanda, 1998), creating duplicities and useless job positions for the matter.

Furthemore, as justifiable as 'transformation' can be, liberation movements used it to deploy party members into all levels of society to ensure a tight control on power in the long run. Former fighters rely on this type of patronage politics which taps into a small section of society that ensures everything stays as it is. In Angola this happens around the oil industry, whose control and wealth is used by the MPLA to have some friends by their side which will protect their political dominance (Clapham, 2012). But MPLA's control penetrates all levels of civil society, ranging from sectorial organizations to the media, aiming to annul pluralist thoughts in society, achieve hegemony and diffuse the lines between party and state (De Oliveira, 2011), leading to policies aimed at a small elite (Clapham, 2012).

Liberation movements took advantage of racial transformation to entrench their control and capture state institutions, ensuring officials were in line with their state vision. This has come at the cost of creating an inefficient and bureaucratic public system that puts obstacle to the development of the majority of the population, which are forgotten by a government focused in pleasing the ones that maintain them in power. When it comes to the economy, BEE programs have served those in power in a similar way, benefitting just a small elite at the expense of the majority of Southern Africans.

CORRUPTION IN BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT

Abismal racial economic inequalities also made it urgent for liberation movements to foster policies aimed at getting money into black people's pockets. This was specifically relevant in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, where white settler rule had long governed over the economies and remained in the country once white-minority rule ended. Meanwhile, in Mozambique and Angola various factors combined to produce a massive exodus of whites, of up to 90% in the latter country. First, the lack of Portuguese will to reach transitional agreements similar to those in the other three countries joined with whites' unwillingness to accept an African government gave way to two wars lost by whites. First, the independence war and then a civil war in which whites supported those rivaling FRELIMO and MPLA rule, as these liberation movements supported the pursuit of a non-racial state that would end with white privileges (Minter, 1994).

The majority black population lacked enough capital to purchase shares in companies yet alone to start their own businesses, which, added to their inexperience in management positions at the private sector made it difficult for them to get employed by large-scale capital. In this situation, the state had to step up, as it was in their interests to have an economy controlled by blacks that would make it easier to then have their support translated into votes.

In South Africa the ANC used the more than 300 state-owned companies created by the apartheid government to pursue its BEE. However, the program was soon to be linked with corrupt practices, blurring the line between what its supposed goals where —to empower the entire black community— and what it actually meant — to empower a small elite of middle class black bourgeoise well linked to the party—. As ANC's Secretary-Ge-

neral Dr. A.B. Xuma said back in 1945: "It is of greater importance to us that while capitalism exists, we must fight and struggle to get our full share and benefit from the system" (McKinley, 2011).

With big conglomerates interested in getting in line with the new government, these transferred assets to party leaders. By 2003 72% BEE actions where related to at least one of the six biggest companies — SA Mutual, Sanlam, Anglo-American, Liberty/Standard, Rembrandt/Volksas and Anglovaal— all of them related to mining, manufacturing and financial services (Southall, 2007).

Many of these deals were also closed to an elite set of ANC businessmen which were appointed to prominent positions in such entities: Saki Macozoma, Patrice Motsepe, Tokyo Sexwale and current South African president Cyril Ramaphosa. These soon became known as the 'fab four' and drew criticism for holding too much power and receiving all benefits of BEE, but the ANC envisioned having black businessmen at the top positions of corporations as a first vital step to then achieve full black empowerment. As Macozoma said in 2005, "having five or six of us (black moguls) spread throughout the economy… can make a difference in a fundamental way" (Southall, 2007). Patrice Motsepe was included in the latest Forbes's Billionaire 2019 list at place 962 worldwide and as the third South African with 2.4 billion dollars (Forbes, 2019).

Moreover, the new set of black rich people used to show how well things where going for them, with some extravagant cases reaching media attention of businessmen running parties where sushi was served off women's bodies, who were only wearing in underwear and weddings which included horse carriages. This opulent lifestyle was also styled in the public office. Ministers in

'BEE' GOT DEEP CRITICISM FOR ONLY FAVORING THE ELITE

the Zuma presidency, as in 2009 they purchased luxury vehicles amounting 30 billion rand (Southall, 2013). In 2011 an audit revealed 95% of municipalities conveyed in patronage politics with actions such as councillors appointing unqualified family members to positions at public institutions, public contracts awarded to councillors and familiars and tenders allocated in exchange of payoffs (Ndletyana et. al., 2013).

As the BEE came under deep criticism for favoring an elite, the government renewed it and created Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE), which pursued codes of practices by sectors by which companies were subject to a scorecard of compliance that measured if they met quotas such as a 25% of ownership in black hands. However, this was not met. By 2008 up to 700 billion rands were still needed to be put in hands of black owners to meet such percentage (Cargill, 2010) and despite nearly doubling since the start of the century, black managers at private companies only accounted 32.5%.

Overall, BEE has ended up being a policy for ANC-related members to enter well paid managerial positions at parastatals which have served them to gain experience and enter the private sector, also pushed to hire black employees with the introduction of scorecards (Southall, 2013). All of this has happened against a background of increasing inequality, unemployment and a disenchanted youth that has felt excluded from the system.

Income relative to White levels (%)

INEQUALITY AND YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

Liberation movements came to power in Southern Africa with the objective of fixing brutally unequal societies where race determined your wealth. The objective was to empower all black citizens and end with poverty. However, in all countries results have been similarly disappointing. Despite a much better macroeconomic success in countries such as Angola, South Africa or Namibia compared to Zimbabwe in recent times, the benefits of growth haven't reached the majority of the population. Huge income inequalities is a common trend that pairs with massive unemployments and the state's incapacity to absorb into the labour market an increasing young population which is increasingly tired of its rulers who have put before the interests of a small middle-class elite than that of the whole population.

Despite the common trends, there are some differences on the inequalities suffered. In Namibia and South Africa, historical inequalities remain in terms of race despite the success of the 'fab four' and party relatives.

In South Africa as of 2008, blacks annual income per capita was a 13% relative to white levels, half a percentage less than in 1995, one year after the first democratic elections. (Leibbrandt et. al.,2010)

In Mozambique and Angola inequality is more pronounced between urban and rural areas, as both FRELIMO and MPLA have focused their power on a strong urban middle-class. Of all of the five countries, Mozambique is the worst off in human development. Two thirds of its population live, with much of its population living on subsistence agriculture, whilst the richest 10% of the country earn 19 times more than the poorest 10% (Bertelsmann Stiftung Mozambique, 2018). This has situated the country as the worst of all its neighbors in Southern Africa in human development, ranking 180th out of 188 countries worldwide in the Human Development Index 2018 (Jahan, 2018). Economic has been unequal throughout the country and four regions — Zambezia, Sofala,

Manica and Gaza— saw a rise in poverty between 2003 and 2009 (Regalia, 2017). Gas findings in the northern province of Cabo Delgado have brought hope and the distribution of its revenue on the population will determine the development in the near future (Vines et. al., 2015). In oil rich Angola inequalities are also steep with a massive difference between that elite connected to natural resources and those living in rural areas who suffer socioeconomic neglecting (Bertelsmann Stiftung Angola, 2018). As mentioned before, MPLA leaders base their power on an urban middle-class that sustain its power and exclude the half of its population which is poor and are deemed as not important for the regime (Vines, 2005)

Unsurprisingly, in Zimbabwe inequality is broad throughout all levels of society. Here differences between a kleptocratic ZANU-PF ruling class and the rest of the population are especially notable. This was made evident when former dictator Robert Mugabe was ousted by its own ruling party in 2017. Mugabe, having served uninterruptedly for the first 37 years of independence, reportedly agreed a 10 million dollar payoff and secured his annual 150,000 dollar salary for life, whilst her wife Grace Mugabe would receive half his husband's honoraries (Burke, 2017). The former first lady was also on the spotlight recently as reports indicated she owned 16 farms, when Zimbabwean law only allows for one per family (Kuyedzwa, 2019). This squandering mirrors badly with the reality Zimbabweans face. Unemployment figures are unclear as sources move between a 5% up to 95%. The main difference is that the first figure counts as currently employed those who work for their own consumption and those in the informal sector, which account for all 94% employed and 98% of the youth (Mwiti, 2017).

The ANC and SWAPO haven't been able to fix the profoundly unequal societies they inherited from the apartheid regime. Despite a relative macroeconomic success and stability, South Africa and Namibia are today the two most unequal societies worldwide with a record 63.0 and 61.0 respectively score on the Gini index (Jahan, 2018). Phephelaphi Dube, former Director of the Centre for Constitutional Rights of the FW De Klerk Foundation, said she believes that middle classes are happy with the status quo, but due to inequality people in the rural areas and townships feel the constitution entrenches a rich class system that doesn't work for them (Dube, 2018).

Lack of employment opportunities is one of the main problems driving inequality in both countries. Both countries experience suffer to include into its labor force an increasing working-age population. Only in the last year 605,000 more persons were ready to work in South Africa (SSA, 2019) whilst in Namibia between 2016 and 2018 a total of 53,774 people entered the labor market, a 3.5% increase (NSA, 2019). The latest data available shows that unemployment rate is of 27.6% in South Africa (SSA, 2019) and 33.4% in Namibia. (NSA, 2019).

SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES ARE AMONGST THE MOST UNEQUAL IN THE WORLD

Unemployment is specially divided amongst two lines: race and age. In South Africa only a 6.6% of whites were without a job in the first quarter of 2019 against a 31.1% of blacks, the group with a highest percentage (SSA, 2019). In Namibia the state doesn't offer official data on income by race, but it is known that deep inequalities persist between the white minority, much of them Germans still living in the country, and the black majority, with indigenous groups such as the hunting San communities being the most disadvantaged (Bertelsmann Stiftung Namibia, 2018).

Furthermore, in both countries there is a 13 point difference in the share of young people unemployed with the

average, with a 40.7% of young South Africans not employed nor receiving education or training (SSA, 2019) and a 46.1% of Namibia's youth currently not working (NSA, 2019).

Several factors contribute to the high unemployment: first, an impoverished education system generates a lack of skilled labour and produces a mismatch between labour demand and supply; second, a stringent regulatory system has put a burden on the development of SMEs, which have reduced in number and employees over the years; third, increasing differences in labour opportunities between urban and rural areas make it difficult to enter formal employment away from big cities and fourth, difficulties for labour mobility due to a deficient and costly transport system (Sulla & Zhikali, 2018).

Despite this unemployment numbers, the ANC and SWAPO have achieved to halve poverty rates, which accounted for half of its population in the early 2000s, thanks to a stable economic growth which has enabled them to create social safety nets for all. However, a worrying trend shows that social grants have continually increased. In 2003, a 12.8% of South Africans received monetary help from the state but this number had risen to a 31% in 2018, a similar trend to that of households receiving at least one social grant, which has risen from 30.8% in 2003 to 44.3% in 2018. (SSA, 2019).

This increase has created a worrying situation. South Africa now has more people receiving social grants —17.811.980— than working —16.291.000— according to latest data available as of 2019 (SSA, 2019). Furthermore, social grants have become the second most important source of income for households as 45.2% depend on them to live. Worst of all, this trend is predicted to continue, with spending on social grants expected to reach 224 billion rand by 2021 (SSA, 2019).

This situation reflects the virtues and sins that liberation movements have committed. The economic growth achieved since independence—expect for the extraordinary case of Zimbabwe— has helped them to create a social net to feed their population, but their inability to create job opportunities and make growth inclusive to all the population has lead to an unsustainable situation such as that experienced in South Africa, where now more people depend on the state to live than on their work.

PARTY FACTIONALISM

Rebel fighters that once had nothing saw themselves in control of the vast bureaucratic institutions set up by apartheid regimes once they entered government. Coming from a racially repressive state, new leaders had suddenly all the state power and wealth they had been neglected and, what is most important, had the authority to choose who benefited from it. As analyzed previously, liberation movement's objectives of setting up a black middle-class that would ensure the survival of their rule under a capitalist system would soon be used to allocate resources, tenders and positions in parastatals to well-connected party members and friends. Capturing the state became the first step to benefit from the system and as such it didn't took much time until factions started to arise within parties which were to compete for party power. Differences arose between groups in different regions, ethnic backgrounds and even sectors (Southall, 2013).

One inevitable outcome of access to government is the rise of a leader above all the fighters in the struggle. Whilst victory was a shared responsibility between a group of rebels, just one was to get the biggest prize: the presidency. This automatically makes the new president the most powerful figure inside the party and the state, relegating to a second line of power those who had fought with him (Clapham, 2012). Disputes soon became to emerge as those who had fought in line with the new leader also wanted his position and privileges, leading to constant fall-outs inside each party.

This was one of the main reasons that led Mozambique and Angola to cruel civil wars. Jonas Savimbi, who had struggled with the FNLA for independence, saw no power in his hands after years of fight against Portugal and created UNITA to overthrow and occupy MPLA's place, which had arisen as the sole beneficiary by capturing the state. Savimbi was never going to let Agostinho Neto reap all the rewards of victory when the MPLA didn't even control the whole state (Chabal, 2001). In Mozambique FRELIMO dissidents discontent with the communist drift of the party created RENAMO with the hopes of reaching power supported by Western powers. First André Matsangaissa and then Afonso Dhlakama after his death in 1979 leaded the pursuit of power, with the former holding a tight grip on power until he passed away in 2018.

As mentioned before, Mozambique ended war ten years before Angola due to various reasons, but a decisive factor was that Dhlakama accepted to convert RENAMO into a political party, seeking to benefit from state resources, and accept Joaquim Chissano's FRELIMO's government, whilst Savimbi never accepted the MPLA rule and fought until his death in 2002 (Chabal, 2001). Only then war ended and since Dos Santos, who replaced Neto after his death in 1979, was to reap the rewards of victory. However, Dhlakama never surrendered in his thrive for power and in 2013, seeing his party was losing support and that through elections he couldn't oust FRELIMO, he decided to go back to violent tactics (Regalia, 2017).

Meanwhile, Robert Mugabe arose as the undisputed leader in Zimbabwe at the late 1980s after the Gukurahundi massacre that led to Joshua Nkomo surrendering ZAPU to ZANU-PF rule. Mugabe has followed a similar trajectory than Dos Santos, having ruled for 37 and 38 years respectively until 2017, when both lost power and influence, however on different terms. Dos Santos accepted to step down in favor of his handpicked successor Lourenço, who after winning the elections has sidelined his predecessors close circle in name of his anti-corruption campaign. Most recently, he arrested accused of insubordination General José Maria, who was for 30 years the head of information and security of the army with Dos Santos as president. Furthermore, Dos Santos' family didn't attend the most recent party Congress, in a sign of a breakaway of the beforehand allies (Vieira, 2019). In Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF had split into two as the race to succeed Mugabe had taken form. On one side where former rebel fighters at top state positions and the military, all leaded by vice-president Emmerson Mnangagwa. The group was known as Lacoste due to Mnangagwa, who's nickname was 'Crocodile' nickname made his side be known as 'Lacoste'. On the other side where a group of younger party figures known as the G40 which, in one way or another, preferred president Mugabe's wife Grace to succeed him in power. The balance between both factions cracked once Mugabe fired Mnangagwa, who exiled fearing his life, and was set to appoint her wife as vice-president. The military stepped up a week later and removed the 37-year long president in a bloodless coup d'etat which they claimed was an agreed transition of power (Beardsworth et. al., 2019).

Moreover, in Namibia and South Africa factions arise when a president has met its two-terms in power and has to step down in compliance with the constitution. Although SWAPO has widely managed to unite under one name with a 'legacy' priority favoring current vice-president, factions have recently arisen between president Hage Geingob and senior party members who support different favorites for succession (Haufiku & Mongudhi, 2019). Rifts have been more evident in the ANC. The most prominent example was the confrontation for power leading up to the Polokwane conference

INTERNAL DIVISIONS PROVE POLITICIANS ARE EAGER FOR POWER

in December 2007 between Zuma and president Mbeki, who was thinking of a third term in office, defying the constitution. Zuma managed to gather support from important ANC loyalists and groups such as the trade union COSATU and won despite Mbeki receiving 40% of votes (Southall, 2014). In his pursue of power Zuma became indebted to many people inside the ANC, fueling a corrupt system that finally made him lose his party confidence in favor of his deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa, who managed to win the succession race against Zuma's supported candidate, his ex-wife Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Two months later, he was forced to resign.

Party factionalism proves that liberation movements have distanced themselves from the reality of its country and the problems of the majority of its population. Instead, ruling parties have turned into mafia-like organizations with different groups fighting for power and tying themselves to those who have supported them. Once in power, they must return the favors received by many individuals, creating a corrupt administration which puts forward policies aimed to benefit the few and not the society.

SUPPORT

The six Former Liberation Movements of Southern Africa have managed to win all multi-party elections since their arrival in power. However, main differences can be traced between countries. The ANC and SWAPO have remained successful in garnering popular support in internationally-recognized free and fair elections, all the contrary than ZANU-PF, which has used state-violence to intimidate opposition voters when elections approach and impose its dominance (Southall, 2013). In Angola and Mozambique decades-long civil wars weakened the losing opposition parties against a winning regime who remained in control of state institutions (De Oliveira, 2011) (Regalia, 2017). Finally, an increasingly competitive and open multi-party system is under threat in Tanzania in the last few years, as CCM resorted to du-

bious tactics so that its presidential candidate, John Magufuli,was elected in 2015. Magufuli won and one of his first measures was to ban activities by rival parties, with opposition declaring he is excusing on his anti-corruption initiative to crackdown on democracy (Kabwe, 2017).

Nonetheless, despite being able to retain power, all except SWAPO had suffered setbacks in their last elections. Following is a brief description of the current political spectrum in each country and an analysis of why, where and in favor of who liberation movements are losing support.

SOUTH AFRICA - ANC

In South Africa the ANC has taken its voters patience to its limits under Zuma, only to rectify at time and force him to resign before this year's national elections, at which Ramaphosa has arrived as a new face promising to end corruption in the party. However, his credentials are limited, as he is neither a new face, being a senior ANC member with important positions even since the negotiations for a transitional settlement, nor has he got authority to criticize Zuma's policies having been his president for the last years. Furthermore, Ramaphosa is part of the known as 'fab four', part of a rich elite who was profited with good connections with business, something he has tried to use in his favor in campaign, claiming he would return foreign investment to the country.

This adds up to an increasingly disenchanted ANC constituency which is fed up of corruption cases, a party ripped by internal strifes with Ramaphosa struggling to unite his party members under his leadership and an increasing opposition with now two parties fighting from its right and left. On its right the Democratic Alliance took power from the ANC

LIBERATION MOVEMENTS ELECTION RESULTS*

ANC - SOUTH AFRICA	
1994	62.65%
1999	66.35%
2004	69.69%
2009	65.90%
2014	62.15%
2019	57.50%

SWAPO - NAMIBIA	
1989	57.33%
1994	76.34%
1999	76.82%
2004	76.45%
2009	75.25%
2014	86.73%

ZANU-PF - ZIMBABWE	
1980	63.00%
1985	77.20%
1990	83.05%
1996	92.76%
2002	56.20%
2008	85.50%
2013	61.09%
2018	50.80%

MPLA - ANGOLA	
1992	49.57%
2008	81.64%
2012	71.84%
2017	61.10%

FRELIMO - MOZAMBIQUE	
1994	53.30%
1999	52.29%
2004	63.74%
2009	75.01%
2014	57.03%

CCM - TANZANIA	
1995	61.82%
2000	71.74%
2005	80.28%
2010	62.83%
2015	58.46%

ONLY COUNTING MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS

DIVERSE SOURCES. AUTHOR: DAVID SOLER CRESPO

in 2016 of economic capital Johannesburg and Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, which includes administrative capital Pretoria, whilst also retaining power in legislative capital Cape Town, effectively controlling three of the most powerful cities in South Africa. On its left, the EFF has snapped 19 seats in the National Assembly away of the ANC, being the party which most grew. Malema's appeal to disavowed ANC voters, especially in rural areas with its land policy of expropriation without recompensation which Ramaphosa has been forced to accept in the eve of the elections to prevent a worse bleeding of votes towards the EFF (Powell, 2019).

Despite going down the 60% share of votes for the first time, Ramaphosa achieved a comfortable majority that legitimates him to rule the country for the next five years, something which was said to be under threat just one year before, when he came to power at the start of 2018. This five years are key to see how the ANC fares. On its favor rules that the political spectrum is polarizing towards populist movements (Pillay, 2019). Main opposition DA lost

votes and space in parliament in this last election in favor of the right-wing afrikaner populists Freedom Front Plus (FFP). The bad results have prompted a major crisis in the DA that has seen party leader Mmusi Maimane resign after his predecessor Helen Zille came back to politics appointed as chair of AD's Federal Committee. Maimane had serious differences with Zille in how to manage the party, which now turns back to an old-school liberalism based on a white electorate after a few years in which Maimane had tried to win over the AND with a more progressive stance (Friedman, 2019).

However on its left the EFF is eating its space. The ANC's future in power depends on Ramaphosa's capability of implementing a successful land redistribution program, reducing economic inequality and youth unemployment and of uniting together his own party under his figure and away from corrupt practices of the past. If he doesn't manage to chan-

ge the panorama leading to the 2019 elections, the ANC should fear going below the 50% share of votes, which could put them for first time out of power with an opposition coalition government.

NAMIBIA - SWAPO

Acceptance and compliance with democratic norms and a multi-party system have represented SWAPO since independence. Already from the drawing up of the constitution, SWAPO managed to include the opposition Demoractic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) in the process (Legum, 1992), ensuring representativity and legitimacy both at home and internationally. Whilst the high levels of income inequality and youth unemployment could pose a threat to SWAPO's rule, opposition is yet to unite and believe in their options. In the next elections set up for November 27th, 2019 up to ten candidates will concur in a country of just over two million people. A new candidate is former deputy minister of land reform Bernadus Swartbooi, sacked by president Geingob, who has created the party Landless People's Movement (LPM) which criticizes SWAPO's weak position on land restitution and asks for developing communal land. (Lela, 2017).

Opposition parties offer no real alternative to SWAPO, who's dominance over the institutions, media and its achievement of reaching voters from all ethnic lines makes it the undisputed dominant party. In a system with no legal threshold to enter Parliament, many are happy with rallying in their home regions just weeks before the elections to maintain their seat and the economic benefits that comes with it whilst they wait for their time to seize power comes, without actually putting a great emphasis in making it happen (Hunter et.al., 2005). For a change of party in government to happen anytime soon, opposition must

unite over geographical, ethnic and personal interests and appeal to a rising young population which can decide the outcome of elections.

ZIMBABWE - ZANU-PF

In Zimbabwe ZANU-PF has managed to retain control of the government through repression, coercion and intimidation of opposition supporters. Any hope that with the leadership change in 2017 things would change with the rise to power of Mnangagwa have practically vanished. Although the 'Crocodile' narrowly managed to win the 2018 presidential election and the political panorama slightly improved, observers still noted voter intimidation, use of state media in the party's favor and the use of the military in its favor, offering food and assistance only to ZANU-PF voters (EEAS, 2018). The MDC challenged the results against the Supreme Court, who confirmed the result.

In the wake of a deepening economic crisis that he has been unable to overturn, president Mnangagwa has resorted to violence to disperse protests and is already resembling Mugabe-style actions (Matyszak, 2019). His incapability to address the shortage of energy supply and rising inflation paired with his increased reliance in violence to assert his power (Mananavire & Kairiza, 2019) shows ZANU-PF is light years away from being the solution for Zimbabwe.

The MDC 2018 election alliance signals that a worsening economic, social and political scenario could tip the scale in favor of opposition. But it is to see what happens if ZANU-PF is confronted yet again with an electoral defeat as in the first-round in 2008.

LIBERATION MOVEMENTS ARE FACING A TURNING POINT: CHANGE OR DEATH

Whilst Mnangagwa accepted international observers in his first elections, this might not be case if he is faced with the prospect of losing power. The international community must set a deep look into the organization of the next elections. International pressure will be vital to contain ZANU-PF's likelihood of resorting to repression if they lose elections and to manage a peaceful transition in power.

ANGOLA - MPLA

Lourenço arrived in power in 2017 losing 25 seats in the National Assembly and a 10% share in votes for MPLA in comparison to the last results obtained by predecessor Dos Santos. UNITA reaped the benefits of MPLA's decrease in votes together with the new third party Broad Convergence for the Salvation of Angola – Electoral Coalition (CASA-CE), which has aims to dispute power to the two dominant parties.

Despite the loss in support, the MPLA still managed to obtain over a 60% of votes and is still has a strong hold on power. However, Lourenço should not sleep on its rivals, as another negative outcome similar to that of the latest election could see the MPLA down below the 50% threshold and UNITA has already voiced its willingness to reach a coalition agreement with CASA-CE and other minor parties if this situation where to happen (Eisenhammer, 2017).

This could happen if Lourenço is unable to effectively diversify the economy away from its oil dependence, as the country is too fragile against volatility in the oil price. Furthermore, the president must make sure he unites MPLA under him whilst also luring those close to Dos Santos. Movements to step away from his predecessor can turn against himself if the former president's powerful family or allies feel excluded and decide to compete for power, as this could break the party into two, a situation which the opposition could benefit from in the following elections in 2022 to seize power.

MOZAMBIQUE - FRELIMO

Similar to the situation in Angola, the new presidential candidate in 2014 Felipe Nyusi managed to retain power but lost an 18% share of the votes which went into opposition party RENAMO. As mentioned earlier, opposition leader Dhlakama decided to resort to violence in 2013 to counter-balance his loss of support and the increasing popularity of the MDM, a third party which has established as an alternative to the bipartisanship existent in the country (Regalia, 2017). Dhlakama's tactic worked as he nearly tripled his votes and RENAMO went up 38 seats whilst the MDM also won 17 seats, despite losing votes in the presidential vote for its candidate Daviz Simango.

Furthermore, FRELIMO lost even more power in the October 2018 municipal elections and despite winning the overall election with a 51.95% of the votes, the MDM managed to retain control of Beira and RENAMO achieved power in big cities and traditional FRELIMO strongholds in the north (AllAfrica, 2018). The rise of RENAMO can be linked with its agenda for a decentralization of power, highly supported in the northern provinces where gas reserves were discovered a few years ago (Regalia, 2017).

It is yet to be seen how the opposition party recovers from the death of its longtime leader Dhlakama in 2018. The peace agreement signed on August 2019 between RENAMO's new leader Ossufo Momade and FRELIMO's leader, Mozambican president Filipe Nyusi, paves a way for stability and ensures the celebration of the upcoming general elections next 15th of October 2019. Incumbent presidents usually face well when facing re-election in Africa whilst successor candidates not so much (Maltz, 2007) and Mozambicans could renew their trust in Nyusi weary of how Momade could perform. However, a

post-electoral RENAMO and MDM coalition could put a risk FRELIMO's hold on power as soon as this year. Simango has already been part of a coalition which involved RENAMO in 2008, (Chichava, 2010), singaling a new alliance is a realistic scenario. However, the death of Dhlakama in 2018 and the peace agreement leaded by Nyusi in 2019 did a lot of damage to RENAMO's projections. In the October 2019 elections, Nyusi benefited from the peace agreement and from the statistics that show that incumbent presidents who face reelection in Africa almost always repeat, whilst those successors are much less successful (Maltz, 2007). Nyusi won with 73% of the votes against 22% of Momade, a strong and clear victory that nevertheless endangers the peace process and the decentralization of Mozambique. RENAMO has announced that it rejects the results and has requested that the elections be annulled and the contest repeated as international observers have named flagrant irregularities. The violent campaign in which the leader of the Women's League of RENAMO was murdered and the difficult election day in which 300.000 more votes were registered in the province of Gaza where FRELIMO has a lot of support, as well as the prohibition of independent observers, cast doubt on the legitimacy of the victory and gives RENAMO a reason to break the peace agreement, whose leader Momade has claimed that has been breached by the government (Louw-Vaudran, 2019).

TANZANIA - CCM

Magufuli's rise to power in 2015 has seen a backlash on the democratic advancements that Tanzanians were proud of. Local elections in 2018 came to confirm the authoritarian tendencies of CCM under Magufuli, as opposition boycotted the polls accusing the government of militarizing the process (AFP, 2018) and the U.S. recorded episodes of violence and irregularities (Mohammed, 2018).

Such has the president's disrespect for democracy

extended, than CCM MP Livingstone Lusinde hinted that Magufuli should automatically be re-elected until 2025, cancelling the general election in 2020 as it is expensive and "as we all understand, no one can defeat president Magufuli" (Mumbere, 2019). With political activities banned for opposition parties, the next general election in 2020 will have a double test: first, how far do Magufuli's coercive measures reach and second, how much support can opposition party Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) gather against the current president's rule.

Worrying actions hint that Magufuli will not fear in using state power to intimidate opposition voters during campaign, but if Chadema actually mobilizes its electorate and contests CCM's power it is to be seen how the president would react, with a violent upsurge being a possible outcome if Magufuli loses and has to step down.

CONCLUSIONS

The changing nature threatens to turn around the established order in Southern Africa forty years after the first win of a liberation movement in transitional elections, when ZANU-PF stepped into government in Zimbabwe. Back then liberation movements came to represent the hopes of many both domestically and internationally, with many embracing an end to colonialism and white minority-rule. The entering leaders had the legitimacy granted by their struggle and decisive wins in democratic transitional elections, whilst also the immense responsibility of living up to expectations. Everyone expected a bunch of rebel fighters who had employed guerrilla tactics and had absolutely no experience in government to set aside racial tensions, unite deeply rotten societies and be able to offer a dignified life to all, reducing the sharp economic inequalities that colonial and minority rule governments had caused. If this wasn't enough, the new international order was set to make things even more difficult. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the dominance of a capitalism system in a globalized world, local economies had to modernize at the same time that facing a worldwide competition from more advanced companies.

It is not surprising that new governments came to accept a capitalist system, forced by international organizations who had to lend them money and their lack of experience, which made them dependent on the short term on the existing institutions and personnel prior to their arrival. Here came their first sin, as liberation movements abandoned their quest for socialism and accepted a crony capitalist society which entrenched large-scale capital companies in detriment of the broad population. Their new objective was to adapt the system to the new reality, effectively deracializing institutions and the economy. While good steps have been taken in this sense and racial inequalities have generally reduced, mainly at state institutions, economic inequalities haven't reduced. Liberation movements pursued the creation of a black bourgeoisie that would allow them to reap their support and continue in power. Ethically positive policies such as BEE have come to benefit only a small number of blacks that have formed a small middle-class instead of the whole population. Furthermore, these are usually party members, loyalists and supporters as the liberation movements have aimed to capture the state through deployment and used public institutions in their favor, blurring the line which divides party and state. With the years this has created a corrupt system by which individuals and businesses line-up behind the government only to pick up its benefits, which range from positions in parastatals, tenders for companies and lucrative deals. Although the liberation movements have promoted Africans to top positions in the private sector,

whites still manage the economy in countries such as Namibia and South Africa. Liberation movements have abandoned their ideologies they fought for: socialism and distribution of wealth in favor of a fierce capitalist system which benefits the big companies and crushes the small. Instead of having a white minority rule now there is a black minority rule supported by whites.

Moreover, liberation movements also came to represent the democratic ideals of both its citizens and the international community. But as it has been discussed, these movements where at its core a group of rebel fighters than indulged in a struggle which took them to guerrilla fighting, reinforcing an organizational structure where hierarchy was more important than respect for the opinion of others. Their struggle was for majority rule, as liberation movement's main objective was not to establish a liberal multiparty democracy, but to arrive to state institutions to implement its reformist agenda. Liberation movements came to represent so much the people's will that they ended believing they actually where the people, excluding anyone who didn't support their rule as traitors to the nation. They feel endowed with the right to power, with politicians such as Zuma in South Africa having said that it is God's will for them to rule forever. They have come to embody the nation so, if they don't rule, who will? More than two decades later, liberation movements still believe legitimacy is bestowed upon them by their struggle and not by the ballot, in such manner that if they lose elections they are ready to turn to repression, coercion and violence to stay in power, as ZANU-PF has proved in Zimbabwe. By turning a

blind eye on ZANU-PF's flagrant violations on human rights, liberation movements in Southern Africa show that brotherhood and collaboration between former struggle fighters is ahead of their respect for democracy. This could also be a sign that, if faced with the possibility of being kicked out of government, parties such as the ANC and SWAPO which have shown respect for democracy could overturn it to stay in power.

A rising young population is now calling on the door. Having neglected for long those who didn't take part in the struggle for liberation, where one leader has not taken power a reduced group of former fighters has maintained the grip on power, as Mnangagwa and Ramaphosa's ascendance to power illustrate. If the youth continues sidelined from politics and the formal labour market, they could soon lead massive mobilization calling for openness and even a transition in government. The increase in protests all across the continent in the last decade seen before shows an increasingly mobilized population ready to fight for their rights and fed up of being excluded from the wealth distribution.

If opposition parties can unite over their differences and grasp the support of those angry with liberation movements in power, the time for change could

come up as soon as this year in some countries. Whilst this is far from happening in Namibia, where SWAPO has achieved dominance in the political arena and opposition parties are happy accepting a minor role contestation, the prospect is not that far away in Mozambique and Tanzania, where FRELIMO and CCM face vital elections in autumn 2019 and 2020 respectively. In Zimbabwe the utmost disrespect for any notion of democracy continues under 'Crocodile' Mnangagwa, whose win by a slight margin in the disputed 2018 could be the last victory for ZANU-PF, which is proving unable to offer any solution for Zimbabwe. Whilst the party has proved capable of resorting to violence after facing an electoral defeat as in 2008's first-round presidential elections, it is yet to be seen if repression would work if they suffer a clear loss. Looking back at past experiences from ZANU-PF reactions to elections results, it is difficult to imagine they'll accept such thing. Lastly, the MPLA in Angola and ANC in South Africa depend greatly on their new leader's ability to remain in power. It's not an easy task, as Lourenço and Ramaphosa must solve the massive economic inequalities, create employment for an increasing young popu-

lation and at the same time unite their own parties, especially the ANC, which remains divided in factionalisms that drives the government's focus away from actually governing for all South Africans.

It is undeniable that liberation movements are facing a turning point in their rule in Southern Africa. Whilst the end time is coming sooner for ones than others, all should thrive for a profound reformulation of their party structures and government priorities. Rebel fighters should open the party leadership to the youth and to women which would help to introduce fresh ideas away from struggle politics. Furthermore, the parties should put their immediate focus on solving the vast inequalities which they have been incapable of erasing in up to forty years in power. It is on their hands to reverse a perverse system who benefits the few and actually work to improve the lives of all its citizens. It is not too late to retake the ideals that took them to government. If liberation movements achieve such changes they will manage to remain in power through citizen support. If not, liberation movements in power will face their death in a short space of time.●

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