Weekly Seminar
Date
10.02.2022
Schedule
12.00
Location
Seminario 21 (Edificio Amigos)
Speaker
Sandra Polanía (Universidad de Navarra)
Can a Government Intervention Improve Collective Action? Evidence on Induced Interaction and Coordination

We uncover the unintended benefit of a conditional cash transfer program: overcoming coordination failures. Beneficiaries interact regularly, giving rise to a coordination device which we measure experimentally using a minimum effort game. Those enrolled for over a year exert significantly higher effort, which is not due to either willingness to cooperate or network density. Supplying high effort relies on individual beliefs that others will reciprocate, a belief that holds in equilibrium for intermediate levels of payoff-responsiveness. This is the first study of the extent to which a government intervention can set a precedent toward efficient coordination among communities

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