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**COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE IN A DIVERSE
SOCIETY: THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA**

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Cooperation with the police in a diverse society: the case of South Africa

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ABSTRACT

How can a country with one of the highest murder rates in the world, but with a similar police population size to the UK, become a safer place for all its citizens? Crime is one of the main problems that South Africa's people, institutions and government are currently trying to face. The police cannot face this problem without the cooperation of the public. In order to better understand why South African people cooperate with the police this study tests the Tyler's procedural justice model in this complex and divided society. The data are drawn from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS, round 2011). By using the *group value model* some Confirmatory Factor Analyses demonstrate that improvements in procedural justice are associated with a stronger national identity for Coloured and Indian people. Conversely, White and again Coloured people reinforce their racial identity when perceptions of procedural justice increase. Further analysis with Structural Equation Models is carried out to test the association with cooperation. On the one hand, for most racial groups procedural justice is the main predictor of willingness to cooperate with the police. On the other hand, police legitimacy is mainly based on evaluations of police effectiveness. All these findings demonstrate that South Africa is a country that shares some features with Anglo-American policing democracies but also with other developing countries in which legitimacy is called into question. Policing policy-makers should take into account the racial differences that this study has found when it comes to implementing some models in order to foster cooperation with the police.

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Introduction

How can a country with one of the highest murder rates in the world, but with a similar police population size to the UK, become a safer place for all its citizens? Crime is one of the main problems that South Africa's people, institutions and government are currently trying to face. Crime hinders social and economic development. Crime erodes trust in institutions and in society. The image of South Africa as a dangerous country still remains, in spite of the relatively recent image improvements enjoyed through the hosting of the World Cup in 2010.

There exists a complex system of security provision in South Africa that is not only public, but also private. However, private security also entails a high price that only some groups can afford. Far from those very well protected and wealthy residential areas, many South Africans live in situations of extreme poverty and with a lack of security. Racial and residential segregation are reinforced by the uneven distribution of policing resources (Samara, 2010). The relationship between White, Black African, Indian and Coloured people has been transformed in recent years, producing a confusing mix of identities and roles (Walker 2005).

In this context, the police need the cooperation of the public in order to reduce crime. Tyler's procedural justice model has proven as a good tool to investigate why people cooperate with the police. A recent study has already tested the relationship between trust in the police and police legitimacy in South Africa (Bradford, Huq, Jackson, & Roberts, 2013). However, some omissions are mentioned in that study: one is the role of private security provision in the procedural justice model, and the second omission is the consideration of race and ethnicity as important factors that might alter the connection between trust and legitimacy.

The main goal of this dissertation is to fill the second gap by investigating the role of race in the relationship between trust and legitimacy, while also adding another element to the model: cooperation with the police. This analysis of the relationship between trust, legitimacy and public cooperation with the police is carried out under a set of conditions that differ from those given in other countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom or Australia, where that relationship has already been confirmed. The specific conditions that make South Africa a different case are its enormous social and economic inequality, its high crime rate, its high level of political corruption, its low life expectancy associated to malnutrition and AIDS, and the fact that all these constraints are tied to racial segregation. Together with these problems, it is necessary to take on board that South Africa is a very young democracy that has not yet been able to create a strong and distinctive national identity to bring together its entire people. As a result, national institutions such as the police may be regarded as empty bodies that are alien to individuals' identities. Another central purpose of this study is to test the influence of group identities within the relationship between trust, legitimacy and cooperation. Both the group value model and the social distance theory are suitable tools to tackle this goal.

In keeping with Bradford et al. (2013), this study uses the South African Social Attitudes Survey, but in this case the latest round from 2011, instead of 2010. In a similar way, this work replicates the procedural justice model, while including the relationship of "cooperation with the police" at a first instance. A following step aims to better understand the cooperation with the police in a diverse society by using two different approaches: the *group value model* and the *social distancing theory* (Murphy & Cherney, 2012).

Literature review

Procedural justice and cooperation

The connection between police legitimacy and cooperation with the police has been tested and confirmed in different scenarios that somehow shared a set of similar characteristics. Sunshine and Tyler (2003) were pioneers in testing a

statistical model that provided meaningful insights into how relational evaluations were linked to the subjective perceptions of the legitimacy of the police. Among others, one of the main contributions to that model was the confirmation that the legitimacy of the police was not only based on instrumental assessments on their performance, but also on how the police wielded their power. Furthermore, Sunshine and Tyler's model showed how people with higher perceptions of police legitimacy were also more likely to cooperate with the police.

This new bipolar structure of the legitimacy of the police has had extraordinary repercussions beyond this terrain. Many psychological and sociological factors are involved in people's behaviours and attitudes towards authorities. Two psychological mechanisms appear in front of individuals and institutions (Tyler, 1997): *an instrumental perspective* that considers the legitimacy of the police on the basis of their ability to threat and punish in cases of breaking the law, their effectiveness in controlling crime and their fairness in distributing services. On the other hand, *a relational perspective* highlights the importance of the police's behaviour as undertaking their work, and especially when dealing with the public. In other words, the instrumental perspective focuses on outcomes and the relational perspective on the manner of treating people. Consequently, people's assessment of police legitimacy will lie more in one of these perspectives than the other, as a result of different context-specific factors. A step forward takes place when legitimacy is defined as a driving factor that enhances cooperation with the police, and when instrumental judgments are called into question as the only triggers for cooperation.

Divided Societies

The relevance of Sunshine and Tyler's findings lies in part in the portability of their results to other societies. Examples of replications of the procedural justice model in other countries may be divided in two groups: the first is made up of those studies conducted in countries with similar characteristics to the United

States, either in terms of policing models, or in terms of similar political and socio-economic systems; the second group consists of those studies conducted in countries that have experienced recent political changes such as a transition from a dictatorial regime into a democracy, countries that achieved their independence in the last century after a colonialist period, or countries that have undergone sharp internal conflicts and divisions that still remain latent. Although this classification is not exhaustive, it may be useful when it comes to presenting examples with their limitations and challenges.

Within the first group, and by analysing data from England and Wales, Jackson and colleagues (Jackson et al., 2012) confirm the importance of the procedural justice model with non-US based data. They tested this model for the first time in the United Kingdom, investigating the relationship between legitimacy and compliance with the law. A second contribution of their work is the re-conceptualisation of legitimacy: "*Legitimacy may thus be instantiated not only in obedience as prerogative, but also in the belief that the police share the values of those they police*" (Jackson, Bradford, et al., 2012, p. 1054).

In Australia, the procedural justice model has also been satisfactorily examined (Hinds & Murphy, 2007). Through comparison with US-based research, the Australian case depicts a society in which instrumental outcomes still have a more relevant weight when evaluating legitimacy, although procedural fairness is also associated with a strengthening of the police's legitimacy.

All these studies have led to a transformation of policing policies in western societies. Many countries have moved from policies in which obedience and compliance with the law were fostered by threat and punishment (Nagin, 1998), to policing policies in which compliance and cooperation with the authorities are enhanced by routine police practices (i.e., treating the public in a more respectful way) (Jackson, Bradford, et al., 2012).

Between these studies in countries with an Anglo-American policing model (Manning, 2005), and those extremely divided and unstable countries lacking a comparable policing tradition, there are some intermediate cases. A recent study with young adults in Slovenia demonstrates "*that judgments regarding the fairness in treatment and decision making quality of police officers powerfully shape legitimacy perceptions*" (Reisig, Tankebe, & Mesko, 2013, p. 8). With Slovenia being a country that is undergoing a post-soviet transition, the interest of this study is remarkable for many other countries with incipient and young democratic systems, or for those that have recently overcome radical socio-economic transformations.

On the other hand, as the Sunshine-Tyler model has been tested in a small number of developing countries, some empirical evidence has been found to cast doubt on the portability of their thesis to non-Anglo-American societies. One of the main contributions of Tankebe's study on Ghana (2009) is the challenging of the validity of the measurement tools used by Sunshine and Tyler when applied to this context. He concludes that "*the Sunshine-Tyler legitimacy scale, which combined two subscales that measured trustworthiness and obligation to obey police directives, lacks empirical validity in the Ghanaian context*" (p. 1279). This finding states that felt obligation to obey police is not linked to evaluations of trust in police in Ghana. In societies in which policing has been tied to a national identity and the police have been easily identified with the protection of the values shared by most people, the connection between duty to obey and trust in the police is stronger. By contrast, in the Ghanaian society police legitimacy cannot be taken for granted, given that a felt obligation to obey the police may not be a reflection of free consent, but perhaps the only option that people have when dealing with a policing system in which any means can be used to obtain compliance with the law. As a result, the connection legitimacy and felt obligation to obey is accepted in this direction, but it cannot be assumed in the opposite one. In other words, not always is felt obligation to obey derived from legitimacy (Tankebe, 2009).

The procedural justice model has been investigated in Jamaica (Reisig & Lloyd, 2009), and although with a relatively smaller sample than those in previous studies, some interesting conclusions may be drawn from this work. The first is the confirmation of the connection between procedural justice and cooperation: the fairer the police were in dealing with people, the more willingness to cooperate that individuals showed. The relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy was also in keeping with Sunshine and Tyler's model. Nonetheless, some disparate results were found, such as police legitimacy not being a good predictor of cooperation.

Moving on to South Africa, many questions arise when investigating the procedural justice model. In comparing the previous findings from the USA, the UK, Slovenia or Australia with those obtained in Ghana or Jamaica, one wonders whether the South African policing model, and in turn the relationship between trust, legitimacy and cooperation, is going to be akin to the former or to the latter.

Part of these questions has also been answered by Bradford and colleagues (2013), who carried out the first test of the procedural justice model in South Africa. The central goal of their study was *"to investigate the strength of any link between procedural justice and legitimacy in a novel context"*. In their model, legitimacy was defined by using two latent variables: felt obligation to obey and moral alignment with the police (Jackson, Bradford, et al., 2012). The main question they tackled was whether an instrumental or relational evaluation was mainly shaping perceptions on police legitimacy, while the effects of corruption, experiences with the police and crime concerns were also taken into account in the analysis.

According to their results, procedural justice was linked with legitimacy. In breaking down legitimacy into their two components, a higher perception of fairness was associated with a higher *"sense of moral alignment with the police"* but not to a felt obligation to obey. However, *"the legitimacy of the*

police seems to be more strongly affected by judgments about its effectiveness, even though fairness still plays a role” (Bradford, et al., 2013, p. 13). Another important finding for the current work is that trust in government was positively associated with police legitimacy and with a greater moral alignment.

This dissertation aims to take a step forward by tackling two omitted topics in Bradford and colleagues’ study (Bradford, et al., 2013). First of all, this work attempts to complete the procedural justice model by testing the consequences of procedural justice in the willingness to cooperate with the police. The second topic is the effect of race in procedural justice, and also in the entire model (including cooperation). This part is carried out by using a group identification approach, in which race is the main but not the only factor. Together with race, other variables such as national identity or political identity will be utilised to test the model.

Before presenting the hypotheses of this dissertation, some brief depictions regarding South Africa are required. There are three areas that deserve special attention to better understand several difficulties faced by this dissertation in its relationship with the group identification approach. The first issue is the role of the police in South Africa. The second area addresses the nuances that define race, ethnicity and national identity in South Africa. The third point has to do with the connection between race, ethnicity and political representation. This point aims to illustrate how race, ethnicity and political representation are geographically related to each other and how such a geographical distribution should be taken into account due to the role the South African provincial governments play when facing crime.

Policing in South Africa

As a starting point, policing in South Africa needs to be understood within its past and recent history. According to Steinberg (2011), when apartheid came to its end in 1994, many aspects required deep change in the social, economic

and political arenas. Policing was an essential area within the democratic transformation of the country, and somehow, South Africa became a kind of laboratory for experts, scholars and institutions around the world. In terms of policing, "*the two sets of ideas most widely on offer were 'community policing' and 'crime prevention'*" (p. 349). Nonetheless, these new policing methods that were fostered by politicians and authorities in order to underscore the political change have had some unforeseen effects that in turn have led to a replication of the apartheid period, although with a different vocabulary. Steinberg's thesis states that in the relationship with the urban poor, "*crime prevention became a vehicle in which baggage from apartheid was transported into the democratic order*" (p. 351).

For this author, "apartheid thinking" had as a main purpose "*to remove black people entirely from South African cities*" (p. 353), with the purpose of keeping cities as a safe place (for white people). Consequently, the police wielded their power in two different ways depending on the area. In wealthy and white areas a polite and kind of parental policing was part of the day-to-day contact. By contrast, in poor and black areas official policing only was visible in serious criminal offences. Ordinary problems in the lives of these communities was typically faced by the inhabitants making use of informal authority actors whose legitimacy was shaped on the basis of either physical conditions or socio-economic status within the community (Steinberg, 2008), and also through the figure of the *kitskonstabels*, the black police officers whose reputation was ambivalent and problematic due to their collaboration with the apartheid regime (Pruitt, 2010).

Policing in the new South Africa has been pursuing new goals but with practices that are somehow replicating and reproducing the same manners (Leggett, 2005) and the same problems that existed during Apartheid, although with a different language. The demilitarisation of the police and the use of community service jargon (Steyn, 2007) were important measures that the African National Congress (ANC) government undertook in order to illustrate a cessation with

Apartheid and a sincere commitment *"to a gentler and more sophisticated policing"* (Steinberg, 2012, p. 346). Other programmes were undertaken in order to improve not only the effectiveness in terms of fighting crime, but also in terms of financial resources (Collier, 2004). No little criticism has resulted from these projects that have attempted to replicate foreign models, especially from the UK, in a context that did not meet the necessary conditions for a successful implementation. Lack of flexibility in the police structure inherited from a military model (Brewer & Brewer, 1994), and also low education levels among black officers have been some of the main setbacks. Together with these, the promotion of many black officers to higher positions, for which they might not have been qualified and as a result of an affirmative action programme (Collier, 2004), has led to a situation in which crime prevention is still an outstanding theme.

On the other hand, there are controversial opinions about the grade of legitimacy of the police in South Africa. Reforms to democratise the South African Police Service seem to have had a positive effect in the opinion of South Africans, who *"have acknowledged such progress through their acceptance of the new South African Police Service"* (Pruitt, 2010). By contrast, the replication of the old regime's practices, as a way of showing that the state is present and trying to solve citizens' problems, has meant that *"post-apartheid police failed to win the consent of the South African public to be policed, and thus resorted to policing aggressively and in large numbers"* (Steinberg, 2011, p. 357).

Another aspect of central importance relates to the values and groups that police are currently representing. In terms of racial make-up, the SAPS has undergone a deep transformation and now most police officers are Black Africans. As mentioned above, this increase in the proportion of black officers has entailed some negative consequences due to the insufficient training that many of them have previously received (Leggett, 2005; Pruitt, 2010), as the police are not only representing a racial group, but are also representing a political project strongly tied to the ruling party, the ANC (Steinberg, 2011,

2012; Steyn, 2007). Through policing, the ANC government is trying to maintain its presence in black poor urban areas, while it attempts to reinforce its legitimacy that initially lies in its purpose of achieving a "better life for all" (Steinberg, 2011, p. 358). Nonetheless, the manners of policing these areas evoking those of the apartheid period are playing against the state, the government and the ruling party (ANC).

From the point of view of police officers, their group identity may also be extremely confusing. On the one hand, police culture in South Africa and in other countries usually bolsters three main cultural values: solidarity, isolation and cynicism (Steyn, 2007). A key follow-up question is whether these values have shaped a new group identity (police identity) to be stronger and more relevant for police officers than other group identities based for instance on race, ethnicity or status. In countries such as the US and the UK, the police represent the public and the national values that are shared by the majority. But in South Africa, the police have been identified with an apartheid state for many years, and those black police officers working for the Apartheid government have been very negatively perceived by Black Africans (Pruitt, 2010). Nowadays, black police officers hold, on average, a higher status within their racial group, but their salaries do not yet allow them to afford a middle-class lifestyle (Steinberg, 2008). These contradictory circumstances might lead to black police officers having more difficulties in defining their main group identity due not only to the rejection from their own racial group, but also to the difficulties of being considered members of a new middle class.

Race, Ethnicity and National Identity

Moving on to discuss the relationship between race and ethnicity, suffice to highlight that there are very few places in the world in which these two concepts might be used without distinction. At least in the case of South Africa, race and ethnicity are by no means equivalent expressions. In South Africa there are officially five racial categories by which people can classify

themselves: Black Africans (79.8%), Coloured (9.0%), Indian or Asian (2.5%), White (8.7%) and other or unspecified (SSA, 2013). Unlike race (which is usually a more objective category), the definition of ethnicity and national identity, or whatever other social identification, lies in inter-group relations. Individuals tend to select those social identities that provide them with more positive outcomes in comparison with other groups. As a result, social identification may vary depending on the time and the place in which interactions take place (Tajfel, 2010). Leets, Giles and Clement (as cited in Billiet, 2002) found that ethnicity is constructed by "*the combination the at least 14 features*", such as "(1) common geographical origin; [...] (3) race; (4) language or dialect; (5) religious faith; [...] (12) institutions that specifically secure and maintain the group; (13) an internal sense of distinctiveness; (14) an external perception of distinctiveness"(p. 388).

An illustration of the diversity in the South African society is described in the following lines:

"Coloured are similar to white Afrikaners. Most Indians and 20 percent of coloureds are now closely identified with an Anglo ethnicity. Within South Africa, there are at least three major white ethnic groups (Afrikaners, Anglos and Portugueses) and nine black ethnic groups (Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana, Pedi, Sotho, Swazi, Venda, Ndebele and Tsonga). A new urban "black group" appears to be emerging (especially in Gauteng province) which cuts across these other ethnicities" (Louw & Mersham, 2001, p. 305).

Ethnic diversity is not only a matter of cultural interest. Many conflicts underlie ethnic group identities. Ethnic identity has been used as an efficient way of maintaining the unity within some groups, as it has in triggering conflict against others. During Apartheid, the white government fostered some tribal conflicts between the Xhosa and the Zulu, with the purpose of preventing them from uniting against the government (Vora & Vora, 2004). Conflicts between White

Afrikaners and English people have also been common in the recent history of South Africa (Southern, 2008). The importance of ethnicity in this study about procedural justice lies in how evaluations about procedural justice, legitimacy and cooperation with the police may vary depending on whether some ethnic groups are being oppressed or mistreated by authorities that belong to other rival ethnic groups.

Political Diversity

As a reflection of the racial and ethnic diversity observed in South Africa, some political parties are supported by individuals who belong to a number of concrete racial and ethnic groups. The two main political parties in South Africa are the African National Congress (ANC) and the Democratic Alliance (DA). The ANC won the first democratic elections after the end of Apartheid, resulting in Nelson Mandela becoming the first black African president of South Africa. In a simplistic way, the ANC represents the black African majority of South Africa, whereas the DA is mainly supported by whites, coloured and other minority groups. The ANC holds the national government, and it is also the governing party in eight out of nine South African provinces. By contrast the DA, being the main party in opposition, only governs in the Western Cape province.

The third (COPE) and fourth (IFP) political parties in South Africa account for another part of the black African population. The ANC underwent a schism in 2008 that resulted in the creation of the Congress of the People (COPE). Controversies and opposing political ideas between the main candidates of the ANC led to this split, but also an historical tension between the Zulus and Xhosas played an important role as a trigger factor (Dunning, 2010). The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) is the third “black” party in South Africa and it is distinguished by its Zulu-nationalism. During and since Apartheid, the ANC and IFP have been protagonists of several battles, with the KwaZulu Natal province being the main region for these conflicts, where the IFP has chosen to join the Democratic Alliance in order to face the ANC’s advance in this region.

In short, this review about policing, race, ethnicity and political diversity in South Africa aims to demonstrate the difficulties associated with superordinate and subgroup identification processes, which in turn are central to the study of procedural justice and legitimacy.

The procedural justice model in diverse societies

Given the rich and varied scenario that South Africa offers, what is the most suitable way of testing the procedural justice model in such a diverse society? Sunshine and Tyler claim that *"it is also important to consider whether the models being evaluated apply equally well to everyone in a community. In particular, do the members of majority and minority groups consider the same issues when evaluating the police?"* (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003, p. 522).

Many different expressions are usually utilised to show the contrast between group identities. The duality is sometimes built according to the size of the groups: majority and minority groups. In democratic societies the size of a group is strongly linked to the political power, and thus, superordinate and subgroup identifications mirror this division. But a superordinate group does not always mean political power, as sometimes superordinate groups may be related to status and economic power.

On the other hand, *"there is little doubt that ethnicity is the most widely used description of group identity in the world today"* (Leach, Brown, & Worden, 1999, p. 760). For minority or subordinate groups, the lack of power and resources may lead to other negotiation strategies such as the threat of ruling authorities, a "homogeneous national identity" or majority government (Leach, et al., 1999). In some contexts there is no doubt that ethnicity has been used as a tool for demanding rights and privileges, or even for fostering separatist movements (Southern, 2008). On the other hand, a more conciliatory perspective shows that a strong ethnic identity is not always associated with a

diminishment of the national identity (Miles & Rochefort, 1991), and that the co-existence of a strong national and ethnic identity is possible in some individuals.

The question of whether majority or minority groups show the same mechanism for evaluating police legitimacy and for cooperating with authorities is part of the broader issue of national identity and social order. The relationship between the procedural justice model and group identification has been extended by using the *group value model*. The group value model lies in the idea that authorities represent the superordinate group, and when authorities, or in this case the police, treat people with respect and fairness, the effect is that people strengthen their self-identification with the group that the police are representing (Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996; Tyler, 2001, 2005; Tyler & Blader, 2003). The group value model suggests that “procedural fairness” may be an instrument to facilitate social cohesion in diverse societies. However, the group value model presents some controversial points, for example when individuals do not feel any kind of self-identification with the group that the police represent. In the first context, individuals tend to use relational evaluation mechanisms in order to make judgments about the legitimacy of the police. By contrast, when they do not feel any identification with the police, instrumental evaluations prevail over relational ones (Huo, et al., 1996).

On the other hand, *social distancing theory* (Braithwaite, 2003) has been proven as a convenient approach for dealing with some of the gaps linked to the group value model. Social distance is a psychological concept that was used by Bogardus “to refer to the degree to which individuals (or groups) had positive feelings for other ethnic groups and ascribed status to other ethnic groups. In the regulatory context, social distance indicates liking and the ascription of status to the regulatory authority” (Braithwaite, 2003, p. 18).

Murphy and Cherney argue that the limitation of the group value model “*is that social bonds may work very well when the interests of the authority and individual/group coincide, but what happens when the interests of each conflict (e.g. through disagreements over policies and laws)?*” (Murphy & Cherney, 2012, p. 184). This approach provides meaningful insights into the procedural justice model in South Africa. The reason lies in that some minority groups (White South Africans) might perceive that legislation that aims to empower Black Africans (and also Coloured and Indian people) over the rest of citizens is not legitimate, even when the government has been legitimately elected (Tangri & Southall, 2008). Somehow, the current ANC government is reproducing a racial segregation in favour of Black Africans in order to reduce the inherited inequalities from the apartheid period. What calls this project into question is that most Black Africans are still living in extreme poverty, and only some members of the ANC are benefiting from this legislation by increasing their personal and business interests (Ponte, Roberts, & Van Sittert, 2007; Tangri & Southall, 2008). Consequently, the legitimacy of the ANC is progressively diminishing (Schrire, 2001).

Although Bradford et al. (2013) pose the difficulties to control all the determinants of legitimacy, they tackle the task by extending the model and including contextual factors such as corruption or government performance. A further study of legitimacy in the South African context is also beyond the objectives of this dissertation, but at least it is necessary to recognise that in divided and diverse societies with young democratic systems, the government or the police might be regarded as legitimate authorities while some laws and rules are simultaneously being viewed as illegitimate by some groups (Murphy & Cherney, 2012; Murphy, Tyler, & Curtis, 2009).

Hypotheses

Questions and their follow-up hypotheses that have motivated this work are the following:

Hypothesis 1

As a first point, it is expected that police legitimacy be partially based on evaluations of trust in police. According to earlier findings (Bradford, et al., 2013), it is also expected that trust in police effectiveness be a more important predictor of legitimacy than trust in procedural fairness. As an extension of this model and in keeping with other studies (Jackson, Hough, Bradford, Hohl, & Kuha, 2012), it is hypothesized that evaluations of trust in the police are associated with willingness to cooperate, and that legitimacy is partially mediating in this association.

Hypothesis 2

Once the first hypothesis has been tested the following question is whether the relationship between trust, legitimacy and cooperation shows a different pattern for each racial group. It is expected that at least the behaviour of the two main groups, Black African and White, present significant differences.

Hypothesis 3

The third hypothesis aims to replicate in some way the first hypothesis that Bradford (2012, p. 7) posits in his study: *'that judgements concerning police procedural fairness will be positively associated with people's identities in relation to the social groups the police represent'*.

Since the social group that police represent is not a neatly expressed issue (Bradford, et al., 2013), this hypothesis has been tested in 4 scenarios: (1) When the police represent the national identity; (2) When the police represent the ruling party, the ANC; (3) When the police represent a racial group (Black African) and there is a social distance between Black African and the other racial groups; and (4) When the police represent a racial group and the status of such a group.

Hypothesis 4

Hypothesis 4a expects that the connection between procedural fairness and cooperation with the police is going to be influenced by the self-identification of individuals with the group that the police represent. Hence, individuals whose

group identity is closer to the group that the police represent will be more likely to cooperate with the police.

Hypothesis 4b argues that the association between trust and cooperation is relatively affected by the legitimacy of the police that, in turn, is associated to the group identity of individuals. Those individuals that have a similar group identity to the police will be more likely to evaluate police legitimacy more positively.

METHODOLOGY

The data

This study uses data from the 2011 round of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS). SASAS is a repeated cross-sectional survey conducted every year by the Human Social Research Council (HSRC) of South Africa. Each round's sample is made up of between 3,500 and 7,000 individuals, foreigners or citizens, aged 16 or over, living in private households, and who are chosen by representative probability sampling. Five hundred enumeration areas (EAs) are drawn from the population census for each round, following a set of conditions: stratified by province, geographical subtype, and majority population group. The analysis of how public values and the social fabric change is one of the main purposes of this survey. Nonetheless, SASAS also aspires to become an essential source of information for policy makers. Regarding the SASAS questionnaire, it consists of a standard part with demographic, behavioural and attitudinal questions that are repeated in each round. Apart from this core, there are some rotating modules addressing specific issues such as 'corruption', 'tolerance' or 'health status and behaviour'.

Analytical strategy

In the spirit of previous studies (Bradford, et al., 2013; Jackson, Bradford, et al., 2012), Structural Equation Models with MPlus 6.1 have been used to analyse the relationship between trust, legitimacy and cooperation (latent

variables). Missing values have been handled by means of Full Information Maximum Likelihood estimation. All models control for age and gender, because of the association of these two variables with crime (even when compliance with the law is not being tested, but only cooperation with the authorities).

Measures

Five latent variables have been defined in order to test the procedural justice model according to the methodology used by Jackson and colleagues (2012): "trust in procedural fairness" and "trust in the police" that are grouped in a more general concept of "trust"; then "moral alignment" and "duty to obey" are the two components of "legitimacy"; and finally "cooperation with the police".

Trust in the police

Procedural justice or procedural fairness of the police (the variable is labelled as 'pj') consists of three items that evaluate how fair, respectful and impartial the police are when wielding their power, according to the respondents' opinions. Similarly, assessments about how effective the police are doing their job are also based on individuals' opinions and not on objective and external indicators. Trust in police effectiveness ('eff') is based on three indicators as well. These two measures of trust in the police are exogenous latent variables.

Police legitimacy

Although legitimacy in the context of South Africa would deserve special attention due to the weakness of institutions and the social cleavages that exist, in this study only two elements are going to be taken into account for this purpose. The first element, that is also common in many studies, is "duty to obey" ('obey' in some tables). This construct refers to the sense that authority should be obeyed because it is legitimate and not from the fear of being punished. The new component of legitimacy that Jackson and colleagues (2012) incorporated in the procedural justice model, and in keeping with Beetham's legitimacy theory, is "moral alignment with the police" ('moralid'). Both 'obey' and 'moralid' are made up of three indicators.

Cooperation with the police

In similarity to the previous concepts, cooperation with the police does not refer to real cooperation but to the willingness to cooperate with the police in the context of a criminal offence, for example, calling the police or identifying a person.

These five latent variables and their respective indicators have the advantage of having been tested in previous studies (Bradford, et al., 2013; Hough, Jackson, Bradford, Myhill, & Quinton, 2010; Jackson et al., 2011; Jackson, Hough, et al., 2012), as well as in the SASAS questionnaire, using identical questions to those employed in the European Social Survey. As a result, the validity and reliability of these measures may be taken on board.

Table 1. Principal components loadings for latent variables

Variable	Factor Analysis with latent variables				
	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	Factor5
eff1	0.85				
eff2	0.84				
eff3	0.67				
obey2		0.91			
obey3		0.82			
obey1		0.75			
coop2			0.94		
coop3			0.90		
coop1			0.68		
pj2				0.86	
pj1				0.76	
pj3				0.66	
moralid2					0.71
moralid3					0.52
moralid1					0.45
Alpha Cronbach	0.87	0.89	0.88	0.85	0.71
Explained variance %	0.49	0.21	0.15	0.09	0.06
Eigenvalue	5.04	2.19	1.50	0.91	0.59

Principal components factoring with varimax rotation. Only loadings >0.40 are displayed.

Source: SASAS 2011.

Group identity variables

Another range of variables used in this study aims to investigate the effect of group identities in the procedural justice model. These variables illustrate a polarisation based on national or racial identification, political affiliation, social distance and group status. The group represented by the police underlies this classification, even though it is an assumption that requires further research (see Appendix for a detailed description).

Table 2. Description of variables

Variables	Indicators	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Interpretation
Trust in police	pj	pj1	2894	2.53	0.80	1	1 negative evaluation and 4 positive
		pj2	2817	2.49	0.80	1	
		pj3	2516	2.44	0.82	1	
	eff	eff1	2978	5.23	2.45	0	0 negative evaluation and 10 positive
		eff2	2978	5.12	2.61	0	
		eff3	2915	4.79	2.71	0	
Legitimacy	obey	obey1	2950	4.89	2.62	0	10 positive
		obey2	2917	4.75	2.64	0	
		obey3	2924	4.78	2.73	0	
	moralid	moralid1	2922	3.73	1.10	1	1 low alignment and 5 high
		moralid2	2920	3.39	1.11	1	
		moralid3	2963	3.19	1.14	1	
Willingness to cooperate	coop1	2970	2.92	0.93	1	1 low cooperation and 4 high	
	coop2	2949	2.83	0.93	1		
	coop3	2937	2.74	0.97	1		
Group identity	SA/race	National pride	3034	4.30	0.92	1	1 low pride and 5 high
		Racial pride	3032	4.26	0.82	1	
	Others	Political identity	2565	-0.83	2.79	-4	(-4) close to ANC and +4 close to DA, COPE, IFP
		Social Distance	2958	6.73	2.31	0	(0) very far and (10) very close to Black African group
		Group status	2996	4.99	2.02	1	1 in the bottom and 10 in the top
		Age	3056	40.90	16.54	16	93
Control Variables			Freq.	Percent			
	16-19		216	7.07			
	20-29		751	24.57			
	30-39		620	20.29			
	40-49		557	18.23			
	50-59		406	13.29			
	60-69		332	10.86			
	70+		174	5.69			
	Total		3056	100			
	Gender	Male (dummy=0)		1,315	43.02		
Female (dummy=1)		1,742	56.98				
Total		3,057	100				

Source: SASAS 2011.


Results and Discussion

Hypothesis 1. Trust, legitimacy and cooperation

Figure 1 shows a simple SEM that extends Bradford et al.'s study (2013) by including cooperation, but using only age and gender as control variables. For this model and for the following ones, the measurement models are constrained by fixing some factor loadings to one (default option in MPlus). However, the paths between the latent constructs are allowed to co-vary. Although McDonald and Ho (2002, p. 75) suggest a two-stage procedure in order to interpret the goodness of fit for the measurement and path models separately, when the

path model has few constraints, the goodness of fit can be referred to the measurement model.

Figure 1. Structural equation model (SEM) with trust, legitimacy and cooperation



Regarding the association between trust and legitimacy, the model is consistent with Bradford et al.'s findings (2013). On the one hand, police legitimacy lies in evaluations of trust in the police. The association is statistically significant and somewhat stronger between trust in police effectiveness and the two components of legitimacy ($\beta=0.42$ and 0.54 , $p<0.001$), than between trust in fairness and these two latent variables (duty to obey, $\beta=0.09$, and moral alignment, $\beta=0.26$, both with $p<0.001$). The fact that trust in police effectiveness becomes a more important predictor of legitimacy than trust in fairness might be correlated with a poor identification of the police with the superordinate group (Bradford, et al., 2013, p. 6), and in turn, between individuals and the police.

On the other hand, individual willingness to cooperate with the police is associated with trust and legitimacy. In this case, the most important predictor

of willingness to cooperate is trust in procedural fairness ($\beta=0.31$, $p<0.001$), given that only the indirect effect of trust in effectiveness through duty to obey is statistically significant, but very weak. This finding reflects that individuals show a higher willingness to cooperate with the police not grounded in the evaluations of legitimacy, but on how they feel that the police deal with them. The fairer the police are, by being respectful or not making arbitrary judgments, the more likely people are to cooperate with them.

Hypothesis 2. Racial differences in the general model

Hypothesis 2 enquired whether predicting willingness to cooperate with the police using trust and legitimacy had a different pattern for each racial group. Table 3 shows the results of an SEM of trust, legitimacy and cooperation with the police for each racial group. The goodness of fit for the full model (SA), and for the Black, Coloured and Indian groups are "good" (McDonald & Ho, 2002). For the White group indices are "acceptable" (TLI: $0.942<0.95$ and RMSEA $0.063>0.05$) (Schreiber, Nora, Stage, Barlow, & King, 2006). Once the model was tested for each group separately, a multi-group analysis with MPlus was carried out, producing very similar regression coefficients.

Comparison between racial groups (B: unstandardised coefficients)

Predicting legitimacy

In starting with the association between trust ('eff' and 'pj') and moral alignment ('moralid'), Indian people have the largest association between procedural fairness and moral alignment ($B=0.370$, $p<0.001$), and the smallest between trust in police effectiveness and moral alignment ($B=0.077$, $p<0.001$). By contrast, the strongest association between effectiveness and moral alignment corresponds to White individuals ($B=0.214$, $p<0.001$). It seems that among all racial groups, White people give more importance to how effective

the police are when it comes to assessing whether the police have similar values than themselves.

Table 3. SEM with cooperation, legitimacy and trust by racial groups

	UNSTANDARDIZED (B)				
	SA	Black	Coloured	Indian	White
MORALID: Predicting moral alignment with the police					
EFF	0.139***	0.127***	0.140***	0.077***	0.214***
PJ	0.223***	0.194***	0.298***	0.370***	0.182**
OBEY: Predicting duty to obey the police					
EFF	0.401***	0.458***	0.249***	0.273***	0.525***
PJ	0.303***	0.096	0.842***	0.546*	0.298
COOP: Predicting willingness to cooperate with the police					
MORALID	0.014	0.070	-0.024	-0.038	0.093
OBEY	0.025***	0.006	0.030*	0.029	0.106***
PJ	0.309***	0.386***	0.104	0.169**	0.186**
EFF	-0.011	-0.007	-0.015	0.018	-0.072*
COVARIANCES					
PJ-EFF	0.660***	0.669***	0.668***	0.576***	0.697***
OBEY-MORALID	0.109***	0.131***	0.108*	0.154**	-0.024
STANDARDIZED (B greek)					
	SA	Black	Coloured	Indian	White
MORALID: Predicting moral alignment with the police					
EFF	0.545***	0.562***	0.504***	0.338***	0.592***
PJ	0.264***	0.253***	0.322***	0.491***	0.179***
OBEY: Predicting duty to obey the police					
EFF	0.421***	0.486***	0.254***	0.303***	0.504***
PJ	0.096***	0.030	0.259***	0.184*	0.101
COOP: Predicting willingness to cooperate with the police					
MORALID	0.012	0.051	-0.027	-0.043	0.097
OBEY	0.081***	0.018	0.124*	0.131	0.318***
PJ	0.316***	0.370***	0.129	0.257**	0.191**
EFF	-0.037	-0.024	-0.064	0.090	-0.208*
COVARIANCES					
PJ-EFF	0.457***	0.437***	0.526***	0.482***	0.513***
OBEY-MORALID	0.150***	0.194***	0.155*	0.299**	-0.028
GOODNESS OF FIT for individual group analysis					
Chi-squared	501	291	190	178	258
df	100	100	100	100	100
p-value	***	***	***	***	***
CFI	0.984	0.987	0.977	0.967	0.957
TLI	0.978	0.983	0.968	0.956	0.942
RMSEA	0.036	0.032	0.043	0.053	0.063
SRMR	0.028	0.026	0.039	0.043	0.054

Source: SASAS 2011. Note: p-value: *** <0.001; ** <0.01; * <0.05

On the other hand, for Coloured people, duty to obey the police is more highly correlated with procedural fairness than for Indian people (B=0.842, p<0.001). Overall, all groups show that how effective the police are at dealing with crime is an important predictor of duty to obey, but for White people, this association is the strongest among all of them (B=0.525, p<0.001).

Predicting cooperation

Very few group coefficients are statistically significant predictors of cooperation. Between Black, Indian and White people, procedural fairness seems to predict a higher willingness of cooperation in the case of Black people than in the other two groups ($B=0.386$, $p<0.001$). For White people there is a negative and significant association between effectiveness and cooperation ($B=-0.072$, $p<0.05$). Further analysis is required in order to interpret this result.

Comparison within racial groups (β : standardised coefficients)

Black African

In this group the most important driver for predicting moral alignment is assessment of police effectiveness ($\beta=0.562$, $p<0.001$). Procedural fairness is also a statistically significant predictor of moral alignment although somewhat weaker ($\beta=0.253$, $p<0.001$). Obligation to obey is only associated with police effectiveness ($\beta=0.486$, $p<0.001$). Finally, predicting cooperation with the police is only determined by procedural fairness ($\beta=0.37$, $p<0.001$).

Coloured

Moral alignment with the police is found to be predicted by both trust in effectiveness and trust in fairness, although the former is the main driver of moral alignment ($\beta=0.504$ and 0.322 , $p<0.001$). Felt obligation to obey the police is almost evenly predicted by effectiveness and fairness ($\beta=0.254$ and 0.259 , $p<0.001$). No direct effects on cooperation from fairness and effectiveness were found, although the indirect effect through the obligation to obey is significant ($\beta=0.124$, $p<0.001$).

Indian

In this group moral alignment with the police is better predicted through procedural justice than through police effectiveness ($\beta=0.491$ and 0.338 , respectively). However, felt obligation to obey is more strongly associated with effectiveness than with fairness ($\beta=0.303$, $p<0.001$ and 0.184 , $p<0.05$). Only the direct effect on cooperation for procedural fairness is found to be

statistically significant ($\beta=0.257$, $p<0.001$), which is why cooperation with the police is not associated with legitimacy in this group.

White

This group shows a similar pattern to the Black African group when it comes to predicting legitimacy. For Whites, effectiveness appears as the main driver of legitimacy, either predicting moral alignment or felt obligation to obey ($\beta=0.592$ and 0.504 , $p<0.001$). Regarding cooperation, the outcome presents a complex picture, given that two positive associations and a negative one are found. The indirect effect through felt obligation to obey is positive and strong ($\beta=0.318$, $p<0.001$). Similarly, the direct effect of procedural fairness is also statistically significant and positive ($\beta=0.191$, $p<0.01$). By contrast, the direct effect of trust on effectiveness is negative and moderate ($\beta=-0.208$, $p<0.05$).

Hypothesis 3. The relationship between group identity and procedural justice (group value model theory)

Hypothesis 3 aimed to replicate somehow the first hypothesis that Bradford (2012) posits in his study: *'that judgements concerning police procedural fairness will be positively associated with people's identities in relation to the social groups the police represent'*.

What is the social group that the police represent in South Africa is the first question that has been tackled by using different indicators of group identity. Confirmatory Factor Analysis has been carried out in order to test the association between procedural justice and group identity in each model. Table 4 shows the results of this analysis. In terms of goodness of fit, most models show an 'acceptable' or 'good' fit (McDonald & Ho, 2002; Schreiber, et al., 2006) (see Table 13 in the Appendix).


Table 4 has the following structure: there are five columns that correspond with five different criterion of defining group identity: (1) national identity, (2) racial

identity, (3) political identity, (4) social distance and (5) status. In turn, the analysis of each "identity criteria" has been conducted in three (for national and racial identity) or four (for the rest) different ways that are represented by the rows: (A) using all cases; (B) grouping by race; (C) grouping by political split, the Western Cape province and the rest; and (D) grouping by individuals with a stronger national identity than racial identity (national) and the rest.

National identity versus racial identity

When the police represent the national identity (national pride), then it is assumed that national identity is the superordinate group, whereas the racial group is the subgroup. In Table 4, column 1 (national identity or South African pride) and row A (all individuals) show that there is a significant but fairly weak positive association between 'procedural justice' and 'police effectiveness' with 'national identity' (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Example of Confirmatory Factor Analysis with 'National identity' and trust.



Moving on to row B, the association between procedural justice and national identity is stronger for Coloured (B=0.39, p<0.001) and Indian (B=0.22,

$p < 0.05$) people, whereas it is not significant for White and Black African individuals. This means that Coloured and Indian individuals who feel that the police are treating them with respect and fairness are more likely to show greater pride in being South African. By contrast, for Black African and White individuals, a stronger national pride is weakly associated with a sense that the police are being effective at doing their job.

Column 2 shows very few significant associations between racial identification ('my racial group is important for who I am as a person'-Racial pride) and procedural justice. The most noticeable outcome is for Coloured and White people. Coloured individuals tend to show increased racial pride when they feel that the police are treating them with respect and fairness. Given racial pride and national pride have the same scale, it seems that procedural fairness is more strongly associated with national pride, rather than with racial pride ($B = 0.39$ and 0.24 , respectively). For White people a stronger feeling of fairness leads to an increase of racial pride ($B = 0.20$, $p < 0.05$).

Political identities: ANC (-4) and the rest (+4)

In this case, the police are identified with the ruling party (ANC) because they enforce compliance with the law that is approved by the ANC Government, and also because their legitimacy derives somehow from the government's legitimacy (Bradford, et al., 2013). As a result, subgroup or minority group identifications are tied to opposition parties such as the DA, the COPE or the IFP.

Column 3 shows that in general, fairness and effectiveness are associated with political group identity. Recall that the scale of political identification goes from -4 to +4, with -4 being 'very close to the ANC' and +4 'very close to other opposition party'. Individuals who feel the police are being fair and respectful tend to be closer to opposition parties ($B = 0.332$, $p < 0.01$). On the other hand, individuals who feel a higher trust in police effectiveness are more likely to be closer to the ANC ($B = -0.17$, $p < 0.001$). Observing the standardised coefficients,

perceptions of police effectiveness have a stronger effect than feelings of procedural fairness ($\beta=-0.13$ and 0.079) in political identification.

Social distance between racial groups

In this analysis, the Black African group has been considered as the superordinate group on the basis of its larger size in comparison with the White, Coloured and Indian groups. Black African individuals account for the higher percentage of police officers as well. Both in the police and in the country, White, Coloured and Indians are the minority groups. Taking these factors into account, overall (model 4-A), both procedural justice and effectiveness are associated with social distance, although in different directions. The more effective the police are evaluated, the more friendly and positive people feel that Black African individuals are ($B=0.25$, $p<0.001$). By contrast, the more fair and respectful the police are assessed, the more negative and hostile Black people are considered ($B=-0.19$, $p<0.05$).

When comparing trends among different racial groups (model 4-B), only the evaluations of effectiveness are statistically significant. Coloured and White individuals show the stronger correlation between trust in police effectiveness and a higher positive and friendly opinion towards Black African people. In other words, when the police (recall they hold a 'Black African identity') are effective at doing their job, all minority groups consequently show a stronger identification with the group represented by the police (Black African).

This tendency is consistent when comparing all provinces with the Western Cape province (model 4-C). Effectiveness is the best predictor of proximity with the racial group that the police represent, that is, with the Black African group ($\beta^{\text{eff}}=0.407$, $p<0.001$, versus $\beta^{\text{pj}}=-0.11$, $p<0.05$).

Individuals whose national pride is higher than their racial pride show that an increase in trust in effectiveness is associated with a more positive and friendly

opinion about Black African individuals ($\beta=0.226$, $p<0.001$). Conversely, an increase in procedural justice is once again weakly but negatively associated with a friendly and positive opinion towards the racial group that the police represent.

Group status

Black African individuals are considered as the superordinate or majority group in terms of race because they are the largest group. They are also the superordinate group in terms of political power, because the ruling party accounts for the majority of Black African voters. However, their subjective perception about the place they occupy in the society does not mirror the previous reality. Overall, Black individuals rank themselves in the lowest position after White, Indian and Coloured people (see Table 10 in Appendix).

In Table 4, model 5-A shows that only effectiveness is statistically associated with status identity, while an increase in trust in police effectiveness is weakly correlated with a higher subjective status in the society ($B=0.063$, $p<0.01$). Among racial groups (model 5-B), Black African and White individuals show an increase in their own subjective status when the police are effective ($B=0.123$, $p<0.001$, and $B=0.119$, $p<0.05$). Once again, procedural justice does not influence group identity when it lies in perceived status.

A striking outcome may be seen in the Western Cape province, where procedural justice is the only predictor of perceived status. The fact that in this province there are larger proportions of Coloured and White people, and recalling the result in model 2-B, may explain this finding. It might be claimed that potential racial competition between different groups is fostering a higher concern about the manner in which authorities treat citizens. Coloured and White individuals are more likely to expect better treatment because they are the majority groups in the Western Cape, and also because fair and respectful treatment reinforces their racial group status.

Table 4. Confirmatory Factor Analysis between trust and group identity. (Goodness of fit in Appendix).

CONTROL VARIABLES		GROUP IDENTITY VARIABLE										
		1		2		3		4		5		
		Unstan.	Stand.	Unstan.	Stand.	Unstan.	Stand.	Unstan.	Stand.	Unstan.	Stand.	
A	ALL	PJ	0.094**	0.068**			0.332**	0.079**	-0.19*	-0.055*		
		EFF	0.026**	0.062**			-0.17***	-0.134***	0.25***	0.244***	0.063**	0.069**
B	RACE	Black African	0.027*	0.068*			-0.098***	-0.10***	0.20***	0.208***	0.123***	0.149***
		Coloured	0.39***	0.271***	0.243**	0.163**			0.38***	0.355***		
		Indian or Asian	0.22*	0.144*					0.174*	0.156*	-0.11*	-0.157*
		White	0.07*	0.132*	0.206*	0.15*			0.34***	0.315***	0.119*	0.145*
		All provinces except WC	0.088*	0.063*					0.235***	0.224***	0.098***	0.10***
		Western Cape	0.032**	0.076**			-0.139***	-0.113***	0.235***	0.224***	0.098***	0.10***
C	PROVINCE					0.748**	0.186**	-0.352*	-0.11*	0.778***	0.26***	
						-0.312***	-0.251***	0.39***	0.407***			
								-0.33*	-0.09*			
D	NATIONAL-RACE	SA identity>Racial				0.234***	0.226***					
		Rest						0.387**	0.093**	~		
						-0.189***	-0.151***	0.267***	0.25***	0.072**	0.079**	

Source: SASAS 2011.

Hypothesis 4: the role of group identity on legitimacy and cooperation

Hypothesis 4a posited that the connection between procedural fairness and cooperation with the police would be influenced by the self-identification of individuals with the group that the police represent. Hence, individuals whose group identity is closer to the group that the police represent will be more likely to cooperate with the police.

Hypothesis 4b argued that the association between trust and cooperation would be relatively affected by the legitimacy of the police that in turn, would be related with the group identity of individuals. Those individuals that have a similar group identity to the police will be more likely to evaluate police legitimacy more positively.

Eight Structural Equation Models have been conducted in order to answer these hypotheses. From the previous section, three types of group indicators have been selected to be tested:

1. National pride and racial pride: grouped by (1) race and (2) province.

2. Political identity: grouped by (3) race, (4) province and (5) national pride.
3. Social distance: grouped by (6) race, (7) province and (8) national pride.

Figure 3 shows the diagrams for each model. Arrows have been drawn only when the associations were statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). Thicker lines represent large coefficients (> 0.3). Dashed lines represent very small coefficients (< 0.09). Red lines mean 'negative association'. Tables 15, 16 and 17 in the Appendix show the results and the goodness of fit of each model (only by race). In the spirit of Jackson and colleagues' study (2012) the fit of these models are good according to the approximate fit statistics although not according to exact fit statistics. On the other hand, interaction effects between police fairness and police effectiveness with 'national pride' and 'racial pride' were included in the model and dropped given they were non-significant.

Comparing racial groups with the three indicators of group identity

Regardless whether the indicator of group identity is national or racial pride, political identity or social distance, there are some common patterns for each racial group.

For Black African people the model diagrams show that trust in police effectiveness is the main predictor of the two components of police legitimacy, whereas procedural fairness tends to influence only 'moral alignment with the police'. On the other hand, legitimacy seems not to have any effect on the willingness to cooperate with the police. Because group identity is only associated with legitimacy, cooperation with the police is not affected by group identification. Only a higher racial pride seems to have a weak but significant effect on cooperation. Cooperation with the police is neatly predicted by procedural fairness.

For Coloured people, all models show that trust in the police predicts police legitimacy. Police effectiveness and police fairness share a relevant role for predicting 'felt duty to obey' and 'moral alignment'. There is no direct effect from procedural fairness or effectiveness to cooperation, which is why cooperation is predicted by the mediation played by legitimacy, namely by 'duty to obey'. Group identity only mediates in these associations when individuals feel a higher racial pride. Then 'duty to obey' experiences a slight increase that may influence willingness to cooperate.

Indian people present a relatively similar pattern to Black people. Trust and legitimacy are associated, but in this case police fairness and police effectiveness are more balanced. Legitimacy is not associated with willingness to cooperate, which is why cooperation is mainly predicted by procedural fairness. Group identification does not have any relevant role within the models, either with legitimacy or cooperation, and only a more friendly and positive opinion about Black people results in an increase in the felt duty to obey.

The White people models are clearly distinctive and easily featured by the following associations: police effectiveness is the main predictor of legitimacy; procedural fairness is only associated with 'moral alignment'; and 'moral alignment' and 'duty to obey' seems to work in a separate way, as though they were not part of the same concept of legitimacy. For White people cooperation with the police is positively associated with procedural fairness and negatively associated with police effectiveness. A possible explanation is that willingness to cooperate with the police when the police are doing their job efficiently might not make sense. On the other hand, private security could also be a factor to take into account in order to understand this negative association. 'Duty to obey' is also associated with cooperation. Overall, group identity influences perceptions of police legitimacy. Politically, a feeling of being closer to the DA and further from the ANC increases the felt 'duty to obey' and decreases the 'moral alignment' with the police. Similarly, a higher racial pride means 'White pride', and the effect is a decrease in the 'moral alignment' with the police

(Black African group). Conversely, an increase of national pride (South African values) is associated with a higher moral alignment with the police. Regardless of willingness to cooperate, White individuals who have more positive and friendly opinions about Black African people tend to be more likely to cooperate with the police.

Figure 3. National vs. Racial pride and the procedural justice model.





Figure 4. Social distance (DISTA) and Political identity (POLIT) and the procedural justice model.



<p>By geographical split</p>	<p>Political identity- *ANC (-4).....DA, COPE, IFP (+4) STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS</p> <p>All provinces except the Western Cape</p> <p>Western Cape province</p>
<p>By racial groups</p>	<p>Black African</p> <p>Coloured</p> <p>Indian-Asian</p> <p>White</p>
<p>National pride versus no-national pride</p>	<p>REST</p> <p>NATIONAL IDENTITY</p>

Conclusions

In terms of policing policies, determining whether a society is more instrumental or relational in its evaluations of police legitimacy is essential for reducing crime. Nowadays, police need citizens' cooperation and acceptance in order to carry out their job in a more efficient way. But when police do not care about the way in which they treat the public, the public experience a process of alienation that bolsters the rejection of policing methods. Something as simple as politeness and respect may turn out to be the most efficient way of increasing cooperative behaviours.

At the first stage, this study has confirmed the relationship between trust and legitimacy that Bradford et al. (2013) tested for the first time in South Africa. In keeping with their results, trust in police effectiveness seems to be the main predictor of police legitimacy. This finding differs from that obtained in other studies in the US, England and Wales and elsewhere, where procedural fairness was the most important predictor of legitimacy. In this sense South Africa is more similar to Australia, where instrumental outcomes still remain as the main predictor of legitimacy (Hinds & Murphy, 2007).

Moving a step forward, one of the main contributions of this work is to test the association of trust and legitimacy with willingness to cooperate with the police. Overall, South African people are more likely to cooperate with the police when they feel the police are wielding their power in respectful and fair ways. Reisig and Lloyd (2009) found a similar result in their study with Jamaican students where strikingly police legitimacy was not a good predictor of cooperation.

A weaker pathway is from trust in police to 'duty to obey' to cooperation. In other national contexts the pathways between trust and cooperation through police legitimacy are stronger, and thus police legitimacy is a priority when aiming to increase cooperation with the police. In the case of South Africa, police legitimacy seems to be an indifferent factor in order to foster willingness to cooperate, which was previously confirmed in Jamaica (Reisig & Lloyd, 2009). A possible explanation for this lies in the lack of moral alignment

between the public and the police. There is also a general feeling that the police are corrupt. Even worse is the general opinion among township residents that Black male police are "*disconsolate, alcoholics and would do anything for a few beers*" (Steinberg, 2008, p. 112). In such a scenario it might be a sensitive issue to enquire of the public why they feel the police do not share their own values (moral alignment).

A second contribution is the study of racial differences in the procedural justice model. For Black African individuals, evaluations about police legitimacy are mainly based on the effectiveness of the police. However, when it comes to cooperating with the police, the only predictor of willingness to cooperate is the subjective evaluation of how fairly the police are dealing with people, and not police legitimacy. For Coloured people, only by enhancing evaluations of police legitimacy (duty to obey) is it possible to achieve an improvement in willingness to cooperate with the police. For Indian individuals cooperation with the police relies on how they feel the police treat people. White group shows a complex combination of associations that hinders a straightforward interpretation. Regarding legitimacy, a felt duty to obey turns out to be an important predictor of cooperation. On the other hand, trust in the police has a twofold effect. On the one hand, White people who think that the police are being effective are less likely to cooperate. On the other hand, when the police deal with White people in a fair and respectful way, they are more likely to cooperate with the police.

The last part of this study tests the relationship between four types of group identification and procedural fairness. According to the Group Value Model (Lind & Tyler, 1988), the idea that minority groups reinforce their identification with the group represented by the police when the police are dealing with them in a respectful and fair manner may be partially confirmed for Coloured and Indian people (national or superordinate group identity is reinforced). Black African people seem not to change their national or racial identification on the basis of how fairly the police are dealing with them. By contrast, White and also Coloured people show that when the police are dealing with them fairly their racial identification (subgroup identity) seems to be stronger. This finding may

be interpreted under a possible context of competition between racial groups in which *“being treated with respect might signal that another person values us at a strictly interpersonal level as well as that they value our membership in a common group. Similarly, just as trust signals the long-term intentions of group authorities from the group value perspective, so might it signal the long-term viability of our interpersonal relationships”* (Heuer & Stroessner, 2011, p. 552). The results show that the variable group identification (either national-racial or political or social distance) exerts a faint mediation between trust and legitimacy and cooperation. Only when analysing the results by racial group do some differences arise.

Among all the limitations of this study, at least three need to be considered. First of all, many contextual variables that shape trust and legitimacy have been omitted (satisfaction with the government, perception of corruption, experiences of crime or contact with the police). Secondly, some variables employed as a group indicator (i.e. national and racial pride) may be called into question in terms of validity and reliability. The third limitation is that the South African Police cannot be regarded as an institution with a neatly expressed identity. The police identity also seems to be also experiencing a transformation driven by the dream of becoming members of the new South African middle class.

Nevertheless, this study makes an important contribution to the literature of procedural justice with non-US-UK data. The importance of South Africa as a country racially divided and with many ethnic groups makes this study of great interest when exploring similar scenarios (i.e. Egypt, Syria or Libia). As a final point, policing policy-makers should take into account that South Africa is immersed in a process of change and of power negotiation in which racial identity seems to play a key role in the distribution of power and resources.

Appendix

Group identity variables

National identity or racial identity

In studying diverse and divided societies with multiple ethnic groups and nationalist movements, many studies have surveyed whether individuals had a stronger feeling of being a national, or a member of an ethnic or minority group (Billiet, 2002; Robinson, 2009). This comparison offers results of great interest for the group value model, providing individuals who feel that the police are representing the national values, a national identity, are more likely to reinforce their own self-identification with the national group if the police treat them with respect and fairness. Conversely, if the police mistreat them, the respondents are more likely to reinforce their self-identification with the minority group to which they also belong.

As a result, the most suitable question to measure this contrast between national and ethnic identity should have a similar format to the following question drawn from the African Barometer:

Table 5. "Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a South African and being a (R's Ethnic group). Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings?"

Q85B. National vs Ethnic identity (N=2399)	Black African	White European	Coloured Mixed	Indian Asian	Total
I feel only Ethnic group	1.61	0.87	1.92	5.38	1.70
I feel more Ethnic group than South African	4.62	10.76	9.62	16.13	6.80
I feel equally South African and Ethnic group	22.95	20.06	18.27	22.58	21.81
I feel more South African than Ethnic group	8.26	5.81	7.05	13.98	7.94
I feel only South African	62.56	62.50	63.14	41.94	61.75
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: African Barometer 2012.

The African Barometer (2012) provides some interesting figures to better understand people’s opinion about their self-identification. The table XXX reveals that South African self-identification is fairly similar between Black Africans, White and Coloured people. By contrast, Indian or Asian people show two or three times a higher percentage of ethnic identification rather than South African identity in comparison with the other groups.

By contrast, the SASAS questionnaire lacks a similar type of question, and consequently, another way of measuring this duality is required. In order to measure to what extent an individual self-identifies with the national group (South African identity), the following question has been chosen:

Table 6. Q53. I would rather be a citizen of South Africa than of any other country in the world (1-Strongly agree...5-Strongly disagree)¹.

National pride-identity				
	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf.Interval]	
Black African	4.33	0.02	4.29	4.37
Coloured	4.39	0.04	4.31	4.47
Indian or Asian	4.26	0.06	4.15	4.37
White	4.07	0.05	3.98	4.17

N=3034

Note: 1 is in the bottom and 10 in the top

Source: SASAS 2011.

In order to measure to what extent an individual feels being part of their own racial group, the following question has been selected:

¹ This scale is the original, but the analysis has been changed in order to give higher values to higher agreement.

Table 7. Q56. Being a member of my race group is an important part of who I am as a person (1-Strongly agree...5-Strongly disagree)².

	Racial pride-identity			
	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf.Interval]	
Black African	4.28	0.02	4.24	4.32
Coloured	4.23	0.04	4.15	4.31
Indian or Asian	4.41	0.04	4.32	4.49
White	4.11	0.04	4.03	4.20

N=3032

Note: 1 is in the bottom and 10 in the top

Source: SASAS 2011.

The main problem with these two measures is that they allow an individual to answer high or low points in both questions, so the contrast is not guaranteed. In fact, there is an underlying matter in that in South Africa, as in other African countries, a strong national identity is not in opposition to a strong racial (or ethnic) identity (Miles & Rochefort, 1991).

The concept of “rainbow nation” might be fostering this ambivalent identification as defending a multicultural society (Walker 2005).

Superordinate and subgroup in the political arena

At the national level, the superordinate group may be identified with the ANC voters, whereas the rest of the population may be considered as members of minority groups such as the DA, the COPE, the IFP, or another. Hence, at the national level and with only a dummy variable it is possible to define superordinate and subgroup identification by using the following question.

Table 8. Q250. To which party do you feel most close? (List with all parties)

	Do you feel close to ?				
	Black African	Coloured	Indian or Asian	White	Total
Other (0)	31.63	77.82	83.87	98.54	52.73
ANC (1)	68.37	22.18	16.13	1.46	47.27
	100	100	100	100	100

Source: SASAS 2011.

² Similarly, here the original scale is shown.

The superordinate group is '1' if the respondent answered the ANC, and is '0' in other cases.

Nonetheless, in order to have a measure of to what extent an individual feels closest to one of these parties, a combination of the previous question with the following is utilised to build a scale of distance between the ANC and the other parties. In this case, it is assumed that an individual cannot share similar feelings towards the ANC and a minority party, so they are exclusive and on a different side of this scale.

Table 9. Q251. How close do you feel to this party? (1-Very close...4-Not all close)³.

	Political identity			
	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf.Interval]	
Black African	-2.05	0.05	-2.15	-1.95
Coloured	0.82	0.14	0.54	1.10
Indian or Asian	0.82	0.16	0.50	1.14
White	2.53	0.08	2.38	2.67

N=2565

Note: -4 is close to ANC and +4 is close to DA, COPE or IFP

Source: SASAS 2011.

Superordinate and subgroup status

The fact that group identities change according to the context, and also depend on many different factors, has led to the exploration of the role of status as a good predictor of superordinate and subgroup identity.

³ This scale has been changed in direction.

Table 10. Q272. In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Where would you put yourself on a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 is the top and 1 the bottom?

Top-Bottom group status				
	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf.Interval]	
Black African	4.31	0.04	4.22	4.39
Coloured	5.42	0.08	5.27	5.57
Indian or Asian	6.36	0.09	6.18	6.54
White	6.67	0.08	6.52	6.83

N=2996

Note: 1 is in the bottom and 10 in the top

Source: SASAS 2011.

Social distance and superordinate-subgroup identity

Assuming that the police represent the superordinate group and that the superordinate group is mainly based on a racial distinction that is mirrored in the political arena, another way of measuring the distance between minority groups and the superordinate group is by using the following questions:

Table 11. Q66-Q67. And now, using the same scale of 0 to 10, please describe how you feel about Black people in general? Are they negative or positive, hostile or friendly?

Social Distance from Black African group				
	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf.Interval]	
Black African	7.22	0.05	7.11	7.32
Coloured	6.34	0.10	6.13	6.54
Indian or Asian	5.87	0.15	5.59	6.16
White	5.57	0.10	5.37	5.77

N=2996

Note: 1 is negative-hostile and 10 positive-friendly

Source: SASAS 2011.

Table 12. Total, direct and indirect effects of trust in the police on cooperation (SEM grouping by race).

Effects on cooperation	Trust in	Estimate	S.E.	Est./S.E.	P-Value	
Total	AFRICAN	PJ	0.382	0.027	14,316	0.000
		EFF	0.014	0.027	0.516	0.606
	COLOURED	PJ	0.149	0.064	2,345	0.019
		EFF	-0.038	0.062	-0.617	0.537
	INDIAN	PJ	0.250	0.072	3,458	0.001
		EFF	0.121	0.071	1,713	0.087
	WHITE	PJ	0.244	0.063	3,848	0.000
		EFF	-0.004	0.066	-0.059	0.953
Direct	AFRICAN	PJ	0.367	0.029	12,530	0.000
		EFF	-0.026	0.039	-0.667	0.504
	COLOURED	PJ	0.127	0.072	1,761	0.078
		EFF	-0.053	0.078	-0.684	0.494
	INDIAN	PJ	0.238	0.096	2,483	0.013
		EFF	0.093	0.081	1,139	0.255
	WHITE	PJ	0.189	0.064	2,970	0.003
		EFF	-0.232	0.097	-2,382	0.017
Indirect	AFRICAN	PJ	0.015	0.011	1,333	0.182
		EFF	0.040	0.026	1,555	0.120
	COLOURED	PJ	0.022	0.032	0.711	0.477
		EFF	0.015	0.046	0.321	0.748
	INDIAN	PJ	0.012	0.060	0.198	0.843
		EFF	0.028	0.042	0.675	0.500
	WHITE	PJ	0.055	0.026	2,107	0.035
		EFF	0.228	0.069	3,298	0.001

Source: SASAS 2011.

Note: controlling for age and gender. CFI 0.996; TLI 0.96; RMSEA 0.05; Chi-Squared: 1311, df 460, p>0.001

Table 13. Goodness of fit. Confirmatory Factor Analysis with trust and group identity.

	1			2			3				4				5				
	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	
Chi-squared	78.15	244.729	180.47	86.68	252.13	180.95	113.41	270.03	214.72	152.57	85.53	256.784	191.237	133.77	131.48	282.5	233.8	178.44	
p-value	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	
df	12	72	32	12	72	32	12	72	32	32	12	72	32	32	12	72	32	32	
close to 1	CFI	0.993	0.982	0.984	0.992	0.981	0.984	0.989	0.979	0.981	0.987	0.992	0.98	0.983	0.989	0.987	0.978	0.979	0.984
	TLI	0.987	0.978	0.979	0.986	0.977	0.979	0.981	0.975	0.974	0.983	0.986	0.97	0.978	0.986	0.977	0.974	0.972	0.979
<0.05	RMSEA	0.043	0.056	0.055	0.045	0.057	0.055	0.053	0.06	0.062	0.05	0.045	0.058	0.057	0.046	0.057	0.062	0.065	0.055
	CI lower	0.034	0.048	0.047	0.037	0.05	0.048	0.044	0.053	0.054	0.042	0.036	0.051	0.05	0.038	0.049	0.055	0.057	0.047
	upper	0.052	0.064	0.063	0.054	0.065	0.063	0.062	0.068	0.069	0.058	0.054	0.066	0.065	0.054	0.066	0.07	0.073	0.063
<0.08	SRMR	0.024	0.04	0.032	0.025	0.041	0.032	0.027	0.041	0.034	0.029	0.025	0.041	0.033	0.029	0.028	0.042	0.035	0.031
	Total *	3047	1873	2652	3042	1871	2647	3017	1855	2622	776	3039	1869	2645	783	3021	1858	2626	776
	Coloured		487	395		487	395		486	395	2241		485	394	2256		486	395	2245
	Indian		279			279			279				279				279		
	White		408			405			397				406				398		

Notes: * Total for model-A; Black African for B ,C, D. Results obtained with Mplus 6.1

Source: SASAS 2011.

Table 14. Correlation matrix with all the variables. Pearson coefficients with p-value > 0.05 are omitted.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
1 eff1	1																			
2 eff2	0.7938*	1																		
3 eff3	0.6633*	0.6425*	1																	
4 pj1	0.3470*	0.3243*	0.3489*	1																
5 pj2	0.3371*	0.3326*	0.3592*	0.7473*	1															
6 pj3	0.3362*	0.3237*	0.3473*	0.5993*	0.6557*	1														
7 obey1	0.3977*	0.3756*	0.3648*	0.2586*	0.2569*	0.2379*	1													
8 obey2	0.3609*	0.3471*	0.3509*	0.2208*	0.2213*	0.2006*	0.7449*	1												
9 obey3	0.3330*	0.3338*	0.3373*	0.2028*	0.2091*	0.1946*	0.6664*	0.7973*	1											
10 moralid1	0.2600*	0.3089*	0.2252*	0.1931*	0.1947*	0.2121*	0.1422*	0.1579*	0.1634*	1										
11 moralid2	0.4227*	0.4395*	0.3771*	0.3351*	0.3436*	0.3167*	0.2610*	0.2411*	0.2208*	0.4481*	1									
12 moralid3	0.4657*	0.4690*	0.4430*	0.3392*	0.3468*	0.3244*	0.3615*	0.3402*	0.3254*	0.3502*	0.5721*	1								
13 coop1	0.0779*	0.0779*	0.1226*	0.2685*	0.2799*	0.2390*	0.1324*	0.1039*	0.0848*	0.0767*	0.0897*	0.1125*	1							
14 coop2	0.1222*	0.1173*	0.1739*	0.2598*	0.2779*	0.2445*	0.1644*	0.1426*	0.1345*	0.0797*	0.1345*	0.1399*	0.6621*	1						
15 coop3	0.1177*	0.1191*	0.1645*	0.2380*	0.2649*	0.2357*	0.1530*	0.1245*	0.1263*	0.0572*	0.1337*	0.1366*	0.6222*	0.8592*	1					
16 National pride	0.0829*	0.0893*	0.0605*	0.0867*	0.0823*	0.0733*	0.0852*	0.1093*	0.0853*	0.1581*	0.1094*	0.1122*	0.0870*	0.0564*	0.0662*	1				
17 Racial pride			0.0370*						0.0967*		0.0654*	0.0869*	0.0469*		0.2596*	1				
18 Political group	-0.0636*	-0.1329*	-0.0397*			0.0531*	0.0952*	0.0624*	-0.1838*	-0.1592*	-0.0870*	0.1135*	0.0689*	0.0426*	-0.0736*	-0.0446*	1			
19 Social distance	0.1823*	0.2108*	0.1582*	0.0509*	0.0522*	0.0405*	0.0889*	0.0720*	0.0653*	0.1275*	0.1568*	0.1388*			0.1396*	0.0882*	-0.2133*	1		
20 Group Status	0.0893*		0.1346*	0.0636*	0.0514*	0.0768*	0.0979*	0.1245*	0.1193*				0.1243*	0.0603*	0.0525*		0.2705*	-0.0953*	1	

Source: SASAS 2011.

*Only coefficients with p-value<0.05 are displayed

Table 15. Factor loadings for SEM with National and Racial pride (group identity) by racial groups. Chi-squared 1735.5, df 544, $p < .001$; RMSEA 0.054, CFI .953, TLI .942

Structural Equation Model with National and Racial pride by racial groups											
AFRICAN			COLOURED			INDIAN			WHITE		
Estimate	P-Value		Estimate	P-Value		Estimate	P-Value		Estimate	P-Value	
MORALID	ON		MORALID	ON		MORALID	ON		MORALID	ON	
EFF	0.552	0.000	EFF	0.518	0.000	EFF	0.338	0.000	EFF	0.582	0.000
PJ	0.255	0.000	PJ	0.301	0.000	PJ	0.468	0.000	PJ	0.195	0.001
OBEY	ON		OBEY	ON		OBEY	ON		OBEY	ON	
EFF	0.479	0.000	EFF	0.268	0.000	EFF	0.298	0.000	EFF	0.498	0.000
PJ	0.024	0.374	PJ	0.232	0.000	PJ	0.179	0.016	PJ	0.095	0.107
COOP	ON		COOP	ON		COOP	ON		COOP	ON	
MORALID	0.046	0.308	MORALID	-0.041	0.653	MORALID	-0.026	0.845	MORALID	0.118	0.198
OBEY	0.017	0.564	OBEY	0.116	0.041	OBEY	0.119	0.100	OBEY	0.310	0.000
PJ	0.369	0.000	PJ	0.117	0.115	PJ	0.240	0.013	PJ	0.185	0.004
EFF	-0.023	0.553	EFF	-0.041	0.607	EFF	0.095	0.249	EFF	-0.229	0.018
MORALID	ON		MORALID	ON		MORALID	ON		MORALID	ON	
National	0.060	0.009	National	0.027	0.551	National	0.115	0.066	National	0.124	0.009
Racial pride	0.044	0.056	Racial pride	0.078	0.065	Racial pride	0.069	0.287	Racial pride	-0.120	0.010
OBEY	ON		OBEY	ON		OBEY	ON		OBEY	ON	
National	0.092	0.000	National	0.077	0.087	National	0.063	0.285	National	0.015	0.746
Racial pride	-0.044	0.055	Racial pride	0.089	0.042	Racial pride	-0.026	0.658	Racial pride	0.075	0.118
COOP	ON		COOP	ON		COOP	ON		COOP	ON	
National	0.035	0.148	National	0.042	0.409	National	0.019	0.748	National	0.026	0.626
Racial pride	0.049	0.042	Racial pride	0.027	0.583	Racial pride	-0.017	0.774	Racial pride	0.029	0.578
National	ON		National	ON		National	ON		National	ON	
EFF	0.070	0.012	EFF	-0.058	0.317	EFF	0.006	0.930	EFF	0.120	0.067
PJ	0.042	0.146	PJ	0.278	0.000	PJ	0.145	0.055	PJ	0.010	0.881
Racial pride	ON		Racial pride	ON		Racial pride	ON		Racial pride	ON	
EFF	0.032	0.259	EFF	-0.146	0.014	EFF	0.067	0.366	EFF	-0.109	0.090
PJ	-0.003	0.905	PJ	0.185	0.002	PJ	0.071	0.369	PJ	0.174	0.006
EFF	WITH		EFF	WITH		EFF	WITH		EFF	WITH	
PJ	0.439	0.000	PJ	0.524	0.000	PJ	0.486	0.000	PJ	0.506	0.000
MORALID	WITH		MORALID	WITH		MORALID	WITH		MORALID	WITH	
OBEY	0.179	0.000	OBEY	0.139	0.028	OBEY	0.284	0.002	OBEY	-0.005	0.941

Source: SASAS 2011.

Table 16. Factor loadings for SEM with Political identity (group identity) by racial groups. Chi-squared 1371, df 500, $p < .001$; RMSEA 0.048, CFI .965, TLI .958

	AFRICAN		COLOURED		INDIAN		WHITE	
	Estimate	P-Value	Estimate	P-Value	Estimate	P-Value	Estimate	P-Value
MORALID	ON		ON		ON		ON	
EFF	0.548	0.000	0.498	0.000	0.342	0.000	0.615	0.000
PJ	0.259	0.000	0.319	0.000	0.487	0.000	0.180	0.002
OBEY	ON		ON		ON		ON	
EFF	0.489	0.000	0.256	0.000	0.296	0.000	0.492	0.000
PJ	0.028	0.297	0.266	0.000	0.186	0.011	0.103	0.074
COOP	ON		ON		ON		ON	
MORALID	0.051	0.253	-0.020	0.831	-0.019	0.886	0.135	0.138
OBEY	0.020	0.488	0.122	0.031	0.118	0.105	0.300	0.000
PJ	0.368	0.000	0.127	0.078	0.237	0.014	0.185	0.004
EFF	-0.027	0.482	-0.054	0.488	0.092	0.259	-0.234	0.016
MORALID	ON		ON		ON		ON	
POLITICAL	-0.079	0.001	-0.085	0.075	-0.074	0.300	-0.105	0.034
OBEY	ON		ON		ON		ON	
POLITICAL	0.041	0.074	0.035	0.485	0.079	0.242	0.140	0.005
COOP	ON		ON		ON		ON	
POLITICAL	-0.031	0.198	0.078	0.156	0.007	0.917	0.067	0.250
POLITICAL	ON		ON		ON		ON	
EFF	-0.106	0.000	-0.072	0.295	0.003	0.971	-0.001	0.986
PJ	0.010	0.739	-0.039	0.584	-0.006	0.951	0.033	0.654
EFF	WITH		WITH		WITH		WITH	
PJ	0.439	0.000	0.521	0.000	0.485	0.000	0.506	0.000
MORALID	WITH		WITH		WITH		WITH	
OBEY	0.188	0.000	0.162	0.011	0.295	0.001	0.012	0.864

Source: SASAS 2011.

Table 17. Factor loadings for SEM with Social Distance (group identity) by racial groups. Chi-squared 1377, df 500, $p < .001$; RMSEA 0.048, CFI .965, TLI .958

	AFRICAN		COLOURED		INDIAN		WHITE	
	Estimate	P-Value	Estimate	P-Value	Estimate	P-Value	Estimate	P-Value
MORALID	ON		ON		ON		ON	
EFF	0.554	0.000	0.461	0.000	0.329	0.000	0.605	0.000
PJ	0.258	0.000	0.332	0.000	0.487	0.000	0.177	0.002
OBEY	ON		ON		ON		ON	
EFF	0.490	0.000	0.229	0.000	0.278	0.000	0.468	0.000
PJ	0.027	0.316	0.269	0.000	0.183	0.012	0.104	0.072
COOP	ON		ON		ON		ON	
MORALID	0.056	0.209	-0.041	0.658	-0.021	0.870	0.112	0.208
OBEY	0.018	0.524	0.125	0.026	0.121	0.093	0.300	0.000
PJ	0.368	0.000	0.133	0.070	0.238	0.013	0.187	0.003
EFF	-0.030	0.437	-0.060	0.443	0.093	0.251	-0.258	0.008
MORALID	ON		ON		ON		ON	
DISTANCE	0.013	0.580	0.118	0.008	0.077	0.225	0.027	0.581
OBEY	ON		ON		ON		ON	
DISTANCE	-0.023	0.323	0.072	0.125	0.114	0.049	0.083	0.093
COOP	ON		ON		ON		ON	
DISTANCE	0.023	0.322	0.029	0.570	-0.008	0.888	0.127	0.015
DISTANCE	ON		ON		ON		ON	
EFF	0.208	0.000	0.359	0.000	0.155	0.037	0.309	0.000
PJ	-0.047	0.104	-0.085	0.162	0.022	0.774	0.039	0.539
EFF	WITH		WITH		WITH		WITH	
PJ	0.439	0.000	0.522	0.000	0.484	0.000	0.506	0.000
MORALID	WITH		WITH		WITH		WITH	
OBEY	0.182	0.000	0.147	0.021	0.276	0.003	-0.015	0.827

Source: SASAS 2011

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