How does inequality in land ownership impact long-run economic development? I study the effects of a land redistribution program implemented in north India in the 1820s. I exploit intra-state variation provided by a colonial policy that led to the recognition of property rights among village communities across 72% of the state. In the remaining area, a smaller number of pre-colonial revenue farmers were recognized as landowners. Using present day village-level microdata, I estimate treatment effects by means of a spatial RD design. Results suggest that redistribution led to an overall increase in durable asset ownership, nonfarm employment and years of schooling, and that positive effects were also realized by descendants of those lower caste households that did not receive land. Using data from a field survey, I find that across reformed areas, such households are less likely to comply with restrictive socio-economic norms, which may be a channel of persistence. These findings are consistent with a dynamic political economy model, which predicts that landowners facing higher competition are less likely to resist the dilution of such norms. The results have important implications for understanding non-economic channels through which landowning patterns may impact development.